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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §§78-2-2(3)0) and 78-2a-3(2), because 
this is an appeal from a judgment and final orders of the Fourth District Court over which the Utah 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Duncan, et al. agree with and adopt the Statement of Issues by Appellant Tremco 
Consultants, Inc. (Tremco), but because those issues are stated in terms applicable to Tremco, these 
Appellants supplement the Statement of Issues as follows: 
1. Whether the district court's Judgment and Orders that the assets of these non-party 
Appellants are liable for the corporate debt of SoftSolutions, Inc. violate the due process rights of 
Appellants Duncan, et ai, including the rights to notice, to be heard, to defend, and against taking 
theirproperty when these Appellants were never named parties and no jurisdiction was acquired over 
them or their assets. (R. 1469, 1488, 1495.) 
2. Whether the district court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that a stock purchase 
agreement and the sale of the shareholders' stock was a "distribution" of corporate assets under Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-1 Oa-1408 and may adjudicate shareholders' liability for a corporate debt without ever 
obtaining jurisdiction over the stock sale proceeds or over the shareholders. (R. 1469,1480,1495.) 
3. Whether the district court may, as a matter of law, determine the existence of an 
"unincorporated association" and adjudicate its membership without the alleged association or the 
adjudicated members being named parties or allowed to appear and defend. (R. 1469,1488-7,1495.) 
4. Whether the district court can disregard the corporate structure of Appellant 
SoftSolutions, Inc. and its non-party affiliate, SoftSolutions Technology Corporation ("S.T.C."), as 
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a matter of law, and then bind the assets of some (but not all) of their shareholders for the corporate 
debt. (R. 1469, 1489-8, 1495.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
All of the district court's determinations were made as a matter of law and these issues are 
all legal issues. This Court accords no deference to the district court's legal determinations, and will 
review them de novo. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, f 14; Culbertson v. Board of 
County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, f 11 ,44 P.3d 642; Gerbich v. Numed. Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1207 
(Utah 1999). Summary judgment is only appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c); see Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, %6, 983 P.2d 575. This Court reviews 
for correctness the district court's award of summary judgment. Nova Cas. Co., 1999 UT 69, at f6. 
The legal determinations of the district court are reviewed for correctness. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. 
v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1, clause 2: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, § 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405 (2001), Effect of Dissolution: Addendum 1 hereto. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408 (2001), Enforcement of Claims Against Dissolved Corporations: 
Addendum 2 hereto, 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17, Parties Plaintiff and Defendant: Addendum 3 hereto. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Judgment Creditor Brigham Young University ("BYU") seeks to collect its 1998 Judgment 
against a dissolved corporation, SoftSolutions, Inc., by obtaining judgment and execution upon the 
assets and properties of non-Judgment Debtors and non-parties, Duncan, et al. 
Course of Proceedings & Disposition Below 
This Court affirmed an arbitration award and 1998 district court judgment in favor of BYU 
and against Defendant/Appellant SoftSolutions, Inc. in SoftSolutions. Inc. v. Brigham Young 
University. 2000 UT 46.1 P.3d 1095 (Addendum 7), based upon SoftSolutions, Inc.'s liability under 
a software license agreement with Brigham Young University ("BYU") and the product sales by 
SoftSolutions, Inc.'s affiliate, SoftSolutions Technology Corporation ("S.T.C.")-
In April, 2000, BYU brought a new and separate action against Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc. 
("Tremco"), a Utah corporation, and "John Does," alleging that Tremco was liable to BYU for the 
1998 SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment. BYU did not allege any "alter-ego" theory between Tremco and 
the Judgment Debtor or S.T.C, but claimed, inter alia, that BYU was a beneficiary of an 
indemnification agreement; that Tremco and SoftSolutions, Inc. acted as an "unincorporated 
association" after SoftSolutions, Inc. was involuntarily dissolved (R. 86-86); that SoftSolutions, Inc. 
fraudulently transferred its assets (R. 82-81); and, that Tremco and the unnamed Does were part of 
an "association" and were liable under Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1408 because they received a 
distribution of assets of SoftSolutions Technology Corporation ("S.T.C"), also anon-party. (R. 85-
83). 
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Only Tremco was named as the defendant in the new action. Only Tremco was served with 
process. (R. 101,99,96,1033.) The "Tremco action," Case No. 000400088, was consolidated with 
the former "SoftSolutions, Inc. case," Case No. 960400497. (R. 386.) Tremco answered (R. 337-
228) and counterclaimed for damages under its own, separate license agreement with BYU. (R. 313-
308.) 
Both BYU and Tremco argued their respective Motions for Summary Judgment in April, 
2002. (R. 1033.) On May 15, 2002, the Fourth District Court issued a memorandum "Ruling," 
granting BYU's Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment, Motion to Dismiss 
Counterclaim, and Motion to Strike Affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan. The Court denied Tremco's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Ruling, R. 1052-1034; attached hereto as Addendum 4.) 
A Judgment based on the Ruling was entered June 13, 2002 against Tremco for the 
SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment, interest and attorney fees. (Judgment, R. 1057-1052.) The Judgment 
declares that BYU was a third-party beneficiary of a contract between SoftSolutions Technology 
Corporation and Tremco, Tremco was "privy" to SoftSolutions, Inc. and was bound by the 1998 
SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment. (R. 1056.) The Court dismissed the Tremco counterclaim, and further 
certified the Judgment final under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). (R. 1054.) The Judgment 
is attached as Addendum 5. 
After the June 13, 2002 Judgment was entered against Tremco, BYU filed "Supplemental 
Exhibits L and M" and a proposed "Supplemental Order." (R. 1065-82, 1139-51.) (The 
"Supplemental Order" is attached hereto as Addendum 6.) That Order expressly allowed BYU to 
collect its judgment from the assets of the non-parties Duncan, et ah That Order was signed July 10, 
2002. 
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Tremco filed its Notice of Appeal on July 3,2002 from the Judgment entered June 13,2002. 
SoftSolutions, Inc. and non-parties Duncan, et al. filed separate Notices of Appeal, under Utah Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 4(d), on July 15, 2002. (Notices, R. 1413 and 1411, respectively.) 
After entry of the "Supplemental Order," July 10, 2002, Tremco filed, inter alia, & Motion 
to Vacate the Order on July 11, 2002. (R. 1157-55, and 1163-58.) SoftSolutions, Inc. filed an 
Objection to Supplemental Order and Motion to Vacate on July 12,2002 (R. 1203-01) and a Motion 
Under Rules 52, 59 and 60(b) on July 29, 2002 (R. 1496-92, 1514-1497). 
Because the language of the Court's Ruling, Judgment and Supplemental Order granted BYU 
further expanded relief, Duncan, et al. moved to intervene (R. 1470-67,1475-71), and filed a Motion 
for Stay (R. 1477-76), and a Motion Under Rules 52, 59 and 60(b) to Vacate, etc. (R. 1481-78), all 
on July 25, 2002. All post-Supplemental Order motions were argued before the Fourth District 
Court, the Honorable Gary Stott, on July 22, 2003. After argument, the district court denied all of 
the motions argued by both defendants and the non-party movants. No formal order has yet been 
entered thereon. 
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Statement of Facts 
Appellants Duncan, et al and SoftSolutions, Inc. adopt and rely upon the Statement of Facts 
in the Brief of Appellant Tremco. Tremco's statements and facts regarding the failures to give notice 
and provide any due process are equally applicable to SoftSolutions, Inc. and, a fortiori, to Ken 
Duncan, Alvin Tedjamulia and Lee Duncan, the officers and directors of Appellants SoftSolutions, 
Inc. and Tremco, and to AST Associates, L.C., KWD Associates, L.C. and Julee Associates, L.C., 
who were the shareholders of SoftSolutions, Inc., SoftSolutions Technology Corporation and 
Tremco. 
These Appellants provide the following supplemental statement of facts particularly relevant 
to them: 
Appellants Julee Associates, L.C. ("Julee"), AST Associates, L.C. ("AST") and KWD 
Associates, L.C. ("KWD") are each Utah limited liability companies (sometimes referred to as "the 
LCs"). Each was formed initially as a limited partnership in 1982,1982 and 1979, respectively, but 
converted to limited liability companies in late 1993 after adoption of the Utah Limited Liability 
Company Act, Utah Code Ann. §§48-2b-101 to 158 (repealed affective July 1,2001). (R. 1390-86; 
1449, at f l l . ) The limited partnerships, predecessors of the LCs, were shareholders of 
SoftSolutions, Inc. and of S.T.C. 
Lee A. Duncan ("L. Duncan") is a member and the manager of Julee. Alvin S. Tedjamulia 
("Tedjamulia") is a member and the manager of AST. Kenneth W. Duncan ("Ken Duncan") is a 
member and manager of KWD. Julee, AST and KWD each have members other than Ken Duncan, 
Tedjamulia and L. Duncan. 
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Ken Duncan, Tedjamulia and L. Duncan were officers and directors of SoftSolutions, Inc. 
and of S.T.C, and are currently of Tremco. (R. 830.) 
In November, 1992, SoftSolutions, Inc. was involuntarily dissolved by the State of Utah for 
failure to file an annual report. (R. 507.) After its involuntary dissolution, SoftSolutions, Inc. did 
not carry on further business of developing or marketing software, or otherwise conduct business, 
except to wind-up that corporation's affairs, including its license dispute and litigation with BYU. 
(R. 1449-48.) 
SoftSolutions Technology Corporation ("S.T.C"), a Utah corporation, was originally 
incorporated in 1989. (R. 327-28.) From its formation in 1989 until January, 1994, KWD, AST and 
Julee (first the limited partnerships, and later the LCs) were shareholders of S.T.C. In December, 
1993, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the "LDS Church") also became a stockholder 
of S.T.C (R. 1386.) 
In January, 1994, KWD, AST, Julee and the LDS Church agreed to sell all their stock in 
S.T.C. to WordPerfect Corporation. (1 P.3d 1095 at Tf4.) The transaction was a sale of stock 
ownership and not a sale or transfer of any of S.T.C.'s assets. (R. 1450-49; 1218-1391.) In 
exchange for its S.T.C. stock, the LDS Church received $1,085,000.00. For their respective shares 
in S.T.C, KWD, AST and Julee received $13.5 Million, the balance of the stock purchase price from 
WordPerfect. (R. 1338.) 
In 1994, when the S.T.C. stock was sold to WordPerfect, all the assets of S.T.C remained 
in S.T.C. (Duncan Aff. ffl[7-9, R. 1450-49.) No asset of S.T.C. or of SoftSolutions, Inc. "changed 
hands" and no asset of S.T.C was distributed to any shareholder. After February, 1994, S.T.C 
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continued its corporate existence With all its assets intact. All of its stock was then owned by 
WordPerfect Corporation. (Duncan Aff. ffi[7-9, R. 1450-49.) 
Because of the potential liability in 1994 of SoftSolutions, Inc. (and, under the license 
agreement, its "affiliate" S.T.C), S.T.C. established a fund for BYU royalties, in the event royalties 
were determined due. S.T.C. maintained that fond even after its stock shares were purchased by 
WordPerfect. (Duncan Aff. Iff 6 and 10, R. 1450-49.) At about the time of the 1996 SoftSolutions, 
Inc. arbitration award, the S.T.C royalty contingency account contained approximately $950,000.00. 
(A. Tedjamulia Aff. f6, R. 1454.) 
BYU never made any claim against SoftSolutions, Inc.'s affiliate corporation, S.T.C, to 
recover the SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment. (R. 96.) Eventually, the "royalty contingency" account 
was terminated and absorbed by Novell Corp., after its purchase of WordPerfect Corp. 
None of the officers or the limited liability shareholders carried on any business as 
SoftSolutions, Inc. after its involuntary dissolution in 1992, except to litigate the claim of BYU. 
The underlying 1998 Judgment was entered against SoftSolutions, Inc. and only against 
SoftSolutions, Inc. ("1998 Judgment"). SoftSolutions, Inc. appealed that Judgment to this Court, 
Case No. 981481. SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 2000 UT 46, 1 P.3d 1095. 
Only SoftSolutions, Inc. and BYU were the parties in that case. No claim or action was ever brought 
against S.T.C, WordPerfect, or others. Neither the Duncan individuals nor the limited liability 
companies were ever named parties by BYU in any proceeding or served with process in their 
individual capacities. 
When, in 2000, BYU initiated the second case against Tremco, case No. 000400088 (the 
"2000 Case"), seeking to make Tremco liable to pay the 1998 Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc., 
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Duncan, et al. were never named as parties, were never served with process, and no justiciable claim 
against them was alleged. (R. 96-91.) Although Plaintiffs Complaint alleged that the Duncan 
individuals controlled an alleged "unincorporated association," that "association" was never a named 
or served party in the Tremco lawsuit. (R. 96-90.) 
No natural or corporate person other than Tremco has ever been named as a party defendant 
in the instance case. No natural or corporate person other than Tremco was served with summons. 
(R2000, 99-101.) 
When BYU and Tremco filed cross motions for summary judgment in the Tremco case, 
BYU's motion was served only upon the attorney for Tremco. BYU did not serve its motions and 
memoranda upon SoftSolutions, Inc., its attorney, or upon Ken Duncan, Tedjamulia, L. Duncan, 
AST, KWD, Julee, individually. (R. 846, 853, 959.) Despite BYU's demands in its motions to 
pursue what it labeled as a "sale of assets," BYU never joined S.T.C. or its shareholders as parties. 
The district court never acquired any jurisdiction, in rem or otherwise, over the payments by 
WordPerfect or the payees. 
Later, when the district court heard oral argument on the summaryjudgment motions of BYU 
and Tremco on April 10, 2002 (R. 1033), notice of the hearing was not provided to counsel for 
SoftSolutions, Inc. or to Duncan, et al (R. 1008.) In its May 14, 2002 "Ruling" (Addendum 4 
hereto), the district court concluded that SoftSolutions, Inc., Tremco and S.T.C. were all part of an 
"unincorporated association." (R. 1004-46.) Without findings, the Court determined that the sale 
of S.T.C. shares to WordPerfect was a sale and fraudulent transfer or distribution of assets. 
Therefore, BYU could pursue the proceeds of the sale of S.T.C. shares, owned by non-parties, to 
collect the SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment. (R. 1042-43.) 
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On June 24,2002, BYU filed two additional exhibits (termed "Exhibits L and M" by BYU); 
Exhibit M showed payments by WordPerfect to the LCs for the stock purchase. (R. 1136-38.) 
Again, BYU's submissions were not served upon the individuals, the LCs, or SoftSolutions, Inc.'s 
counsel - only upon Tremco's counsel. (R. 1136, 1140.) 
With its motion, BYU submitted a proposed order, relying upon BYU's new Exhibits L and 
M, which greatly expanded the June 13,2002 Judgment by "finding" that, individually, Duncan, et 
al. - who had never been made parties to this action nor served with any process - were also 
members of the supposed "unincorporated association," the debt of SoftSolutions, hie, was also the 
debt of an "unincorporated association," and the stock sale proceeds were association assets. 
Therefore, according to the Order, BYU could enforce its judgments against any proceeds that the 
LCs had received from the sale of their S.T.C. shares to WordPerfect in 1994. (R. 1139-51.) 
Duncan, et al were found jointly and personally liable for the SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment. (R. 
1143.) The July 10,2002 Order further authorized BYU to execute on property owned by "any other 
person" that is traceable to proceeds from the sale of S.T.C. shares. (R. 1142.) 
Tremco, SoftSolutions, Inc. and Duncan, et al. each timely filed separate appeals from the 
June 13, 2002 Judgment. (R. 1412-15.) 
On July 25,2002, Duncan, et al moved to intervene and joined in Tremco's motion to stay 
enforcement of the Supplemental Order and the Judgment. Duncan, et al and SoftSolutions, Inc. 
also filed objections to and motions to vacate the July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order timely under 
Rules 52, 59 and 60(b) to suspend the finality of that Order. 
On July 22,2003, Judge Stott heard oral argument on the Appellants' objections and motions 
to vacate the July 10,2002 Order, and motions for stay of execution pending resolution of the appeal. 
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Judge Stott denied the motions to vacate and the motions for a stay, ruling from the bench that 
Duncan, et al.'s due process rights had not been violated by entry of the July 10,2002 Supplemental 
Order authorizing execution on Duncan, et a/.'s property to satisfy the Judgments against Tremco 
and SoftSolutions, Inc., because there was a commonality of officers (Ken Duncan, Tedjamulia, and 
L. Duncan) between the entities, and service upon one member of the alleged association was 
sufficient for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over SoftSolutions, Inc. 's and Tremco's shareholders 
and officers. 
Judge Stott also denied Duncan, et aVs Motion to Intervene because their individual interests 
had been adequately represented by the corporate Judgment Debtors. No order has yet been entered 
denying these motions. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Judgment and the resulting July 10, 2002 Order by the district court were entered in 
violation of the fundamental right to constitutional due process of law to which all persons are 
entitled, including the officers and shareholders of SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco. The Judgment 
and Supplemental Order allow BYU to execute on property both inside and outside the State of Utah 
that is owned by non-judgment debtor third-parties who have never been named defendants in any 
complaint by BYU, have never been served any summons bringing them personally within the 
jurisdiction of the Fourth District Court in Utah County, were never served the motions on which 
the July 10,2002 Supplemental Order was based, and were never provided opportunity to be heard 
on their individual liability to BYU or to defend. The entire basis for the district court's rulings is 
fatally flawed and void. 
The Court's Judgment contradicts fundamental principles of constitutional due process and 
established precedence of limited corporate liability by disregarding the separate corporate existences 
of both defendant corporations, "piercing" their corporate veils and by a novel theory of an 
"association" to require payment for corporate debts by their their shareholders and officers (and by 
other non-party corporate entities). BYU has neither pled nor proven any claim for alter-ego 
liability, or indeed properly invoked jurisdiction over the non-parties or their assets. 
Simply, Tremco's and SoftSolutions, Inc.'s shareholders' and officers' fundamental rights 
to due process of law under the State and Federal Constitutions have been and continue to be 
violated. The Court's Judgment and Supplemental Order are void as against these Appellants, and 
should be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT AND THE JULY 10, 2002 ORDER ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
BECAUSE THEY DEPRIVE DUNCAN, ET AL.. 
NON-PARTY CORPORATE OFFICERS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 
OF THEIR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
The gravamen of this appeal is that the Tremco Judgment and the Supplemental Order are 
a clear unconstitutional denial of due process of law as against Duncan, et al In conjunction, they 
authorize BYU to execute against the real and personal property of the shareholders and officers of 
the defendant corporations, even though the officers and shareholders were never named as 
defendants in any action, never served a summons bringing them within the jurisdiction of the Fourth 
District Court, never served BYU's motions resulting in the Order, and never provided a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard on the asserted ownership of their assets. The Utah and United States 
Constitutions each prohibit depriving persons of their property without due process of law. U.S. 
Const., Amend. XIV, §1; Utah Const., Art. 1, §7; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972). The 
State and Federal due process clauses have well-established requirements that must be satisfied 
before a judgment is imposed against a person. 
Due process requires a person be named a party to an action before being held liable to pay 
a judgment rendered in that action. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 
110 (1960). Due process requires a person be served a summons and brought within a court's 
jurisdiction before that court may exercise and render judgment. Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe 
Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344,350 (1999) ("In the absence of service of process (or waiver of service 
by a defendant), a court may not exercise power over a party the complaint names as a defendant."); 
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see Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 110. A fortiori, the court has no jurisdiction to exercise power 
over unserved persons not even named as defendants. 
Due process requires a person be provided notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 
on an issue, before that issue is decided adverse to him. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 
1990) ('Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are at the 
very heart of procedural fairness." citation omitted); Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n., 740 P.2d 1331, 
1334 (Utah 1987). 
These are absolute minimum and basic requirements of due process. As the United States 
Supreme Court has explained: 
It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam 
resulting from litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to 
which he has not been made a party by service of process. The 
consistent constitutional rule has been that a court has no power to 
adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has 
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1960) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, these jurisdictional notice requirements are necessary safeguards that cannot simply be 
brushed under the carpet. 
"[WJhere a jurisdictional notice is required to be given in a certain 
manner, any means other than that prescribed is ineffective. This 
is so even though the intended recipient of that notice does in fact 
acquire the knowledge contemplated by the law. Such a rule is no 
mere 'legal technicality5 rather it is a fundamental safeguard 
assuring each citizen that he will be afforded due process of law. Nor 
may the requirement be relaxed merely because of a showing that 
certain complaining parties did have actual notice of the proceeding." 
Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment. 598 P.2d 1339, 1345 (Utah 1979) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
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It is axiomatic that a court acquires the power to adjudicate by proper service of process 
which imparts notice to the defendant he is being sued, and must appear and defend. "In that manner 
a court acquires jurisdiction to enter ajudgment against a party." Myers v. Interwest Corp.. 632 P.2d 
879, 880 (Utah 1981). Actual service of process is jurisdictional. Mere actual knowledge of an 
action or claim cannot suffice. Service of process is required to confer jurisdiction and cannot be 
supplanted by other means. In the absence of service of process, a court does not have jurisdiction 
to render its judgment, even though the defendant corporation has notice of the action. Murdock v. 
Blake. 484 P.2d 164,167 (Utah 1971). 
The June Judgment and the July Supplemental Order were entered without service or 
bringing Duncan, et al before the court, and without jurisdiction to affect the property and rights of 
Duncan, et al. It is of no consequence whether the July Supplemental Order was entered as an 
enforcement order "in supplemental proceedings" of the SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment or the 2002 
Tremco Judgment or, as we believe, an appealable order in its own right. Both are void. 
The Court's Ruling and Judgment are based upon factual assumptions made without 
jurisdiction and contrary to the evidence. The July Supplemental Order also makes specific findings 
of fact, even though no evidentiary hearing was held by Judge Howard. The Court's rulings are 
unquestionably adverse to Messrs. Duncan, Tedjamulia and Duncan, and to the corporate entities 
KWD, AST and Julee. Based upon the Judgment and the "findings," the Court authorizes BYU to 
levy on any and all property received by the three natural persons and three corporate entities from 
the 1994 stock sale to WordPerfect to satisfy the 1998 Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. (R. 
1143-42.) The Court has determined that separate assets of Duncan, et al are "property of the 
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unincorporated association." The Court had no power over the property or the persons to make such 
an adjudication. 
The record is clear that the individuals and corporate entities adversely affected, Duncan, et 
al.9 were never made parties to any action against BYU or brought within the Court's jurisdiction. 
They were not parties to the 1990 License Agreement with BYU, containing the arbitration clause. 
They were not parties to the arbitration brought pursuant to that clause. They were not named parties 
or served in the 1996 case between SoftSolutions, Inc. and BYU. They were neither named parties 
nor served any summons in the 2000 case between BYU and Tremco. And, they were never served 
with BYU's motions or documents resulting in the Judgment or the Supplemental Order. 
In Zenith Radio, the US. Supreme Court held that even when a corporate defendant 
stipulates to its parent corporation being treated the same as the subsidiary for purposes of the 
litigation, it violates that parent's right to due process of law to impose upon the parent a judgment 
rendered against the subsidiary. 395 U.S. at 109-10. 
Due process is not satisfied merely because the individuals were officers or AST, KWD and 
Julee were shareholders of SoftSolutions, Inc. or of S.T.C, also never a party. Due process is also 
not satisfied merely because Ken Duncan, Tedjamulia and L. Duncan were involved in or directed 
the arbitration and litigation proceedings as officers of SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco. As the 
Zenith Radio Court explained, even if the parent "through its officer . . . in fact controlled the 
litigation on behalf of [the subsidiary], and if the claim were made that the judgment against [the 
subsidiary] would be res judicata against [the parent], that claim itself could be finally adjudicated 
against [the parent] only in a court with jurisdiction over that company." Id. at 111 (emphasis 
added). 
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Due process is not satisfied because the assets BYU now seizes are somehow traceable to 
proceeds of the sale of S.T.C. stock. Indeed, BYU seeks to execute upon real and personal property 
located outside the State of Utah and which are owned by other successors in interest to KWD. BYU 
has filed its Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. in Montana for that very purpose because the 
Montana properties are proceeds of the sale of S.T.C. stock. The district court must have personal 
jurisdiction over the owner of that property, or the property itself, and a justiciable claim to affect 
title to that property. Pennover v. Neff 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1877). When title and ownership of 
property itself are questioned, the property must be brought before the court and the court must 
acquire control over both the subject property and the parties. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n v. 
Wooras, 97 Utah 351, 364-5, 93 P.2d 455 (1939). Jurisdiction is acquired by filing a sufficient 
complaint and proper service. And when jurisdiction is not acquired, the judgment is void. 
The denial of the due process right of non-parties Duncan, et al. by the entry of a judgment 
or order affecting them or their property is clear. The Tremco Judgment and any Supplemental 
Order based thereon are void and must be vacated. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE 
ENTITIES AND BY HOLDING DUNCAN, ET AL. AND THEIR ASSETS 
JOINTLY LIABLE FOR THE CORPORATE DEBT 
The Tremco Judgment and the Supplemental Order should be reversed because they blatantly 
contradict binding precedent of this Court that a shareholder or officer of a corporation is not liable 
to pay a corporate debt unless it is proven that the shareholder or officer is the corporation's alter-
ego. This Court has repeatedly stated that "a corporation is regarded as a legal entity, separate and 
apart from its stockholders." Dockstader v. Walker, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973); accord 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc.. 789 P.2d 24,26 (Utah 1990). Only 
when a third party proves (1) such unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its 
shareholder or officer that the separate personalities no longer exist, and (2) observance of the 
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice or an inequitable result may a court 
disregard a corporation's separate existence. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc., 789 P.2d, at 26 
(citations omitted). Stated simply, the district court does not have "carte blanche to refuse to 
recognize the legal separation of shareholder and corporation," even where such recognition "would 
in some way prevent a creditor of a controlling shareholder from quickly being made whole." Id. 
The Judgment and Supplemental Order disregard the separate corporate existences of 
SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco by making their officers and shareholders pay the Judgments against 
SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco rendered upon the individual corporate debt of only SoftSolutions, 
Inc. In this case, BYU has never pled any theory, offered any evidence, or met its burden to prove 
the elements of alter-ego liability of Duncan, et al. In the absence of such pleading and proof, any 
adjudication of officer or shareholder liability is prejudicial error. Without any pleading or proof of 
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alter-ego liability, such wholesale nullification of Tremco's and SoftSolutions, Inc.'s corporate 
existence is flatly contrary to precedent. 
"Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a separate and distinct legal 
entity from its stockholders." Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 
510 P.2d 526, 528 (1973). The purpose of such separation is to 
insulate the stockholders from the liabilities of the corporation, thus 
limiting their liability to only the amount that the stockholders 
voluntarily put at risk. [Citation omitted.] Courts must balance 
piercing and insulating policies and will only reluctantly and 
cautiously pierce the corporate veil. [Citations omitted.] 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42,46 (Ut. App. 1988). "A key feature of the 
alter ego theory is that it is an equitable doctrine requiring that each case be determined upon its 
peculiar facts." Id at 47. In this case, BYU did not allege the alter-ego liability of the directors and 
shareholders of the defendant corporations. No claim was ever stated against them, much less 
factually proved. Neither were they made parties before the Court, nor served. 
Limited corporate liability is not just an historic principle to be cast aside to remedy a 
creditor's demand. As one commentator has explained, limited corporate liability is vital because 
it 
promote[s] commerce and industrial growth by encouraging 
shareholders to make capital contributions to corporations without 
subjecting all of their personal wealth to the risks of the business. 
This incentive to business investment has been called the most 
important legal development of the nineteenth century. 
David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil 17 Willamette L. Rev. 371, 371-73 (1981); accord 
James Constructors, 761 P.2d at 46«n. 9. "In fact, limited liability is one of the principal purposes 
for which the law has created the corporation." 1 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations §41.20 at 596-97 (1999); accord 18 C I S . Corporations §16 (1990) ('The law permits 
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the incorporation of a business for the very purpose of escaping personal liability . . . ."); Barber, 
supra, at 373 ("[C]"ourts of every jurisdiction have recognized the legitimacy of incorporating to 
avoid personal liability."). 
BYU's creative allegation of an "unincorporated association" of corporations, officers and 
shareholders may be creative, but is still allegation. Even under the facts BYU argues, it is 
inappropriate to find such an association as a matter of law. The defendant's corporate officers acted 
as officers and directors of the corporation for which they acted. The entity shareholders did not 
exceed their bounds as shareholders. There is not even any demonstrated fact by BYU that it was 
at all confused or mislead by corporate officers or shareholders. 
Certainly, the officers of SoftSolutions, Inc., and later Tremco, substantially participated in 
and directed the litigations with BYU, as officers and directors. It was their fiduciary duty to do so. 
However, acting as officers and directors does not bind them individually, or bind shareholders. 
Otherwise, a corporate veil could never exist when any officer or directors was also a shareholder. 
Because a person participates in a representative capacity in litigation does not bind that 
person, individually, by the determinations made. 
The protection of limited liability to corporate officers and shareholders was erroneously cast 
aside by the lower court without any factual or legal basis. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY ADJUDICATED 
DUNCAN, ETAL. AND THEIR ASSETS 
AS PART OF AN "UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION" 
The Judgment below and the Supplemental Order purport to adjudicate the personal assets 
of Duncan, et al. to be the assets of an "unincorporated association." Not having either the assets 
or the owners before the Court, the Court could not properly adjudicate whether Appellants Duncan, 
et al. were "members" of the so-called association or that their assets were association assets. 
There is no evidence before the Court to support its determination as a matter of law that 
individuals Duncan and Tedjamulia, or KWD, AST or Julee ever negotiated or entered into any 
agreement with BYU or transacted business under any common, unincorporated name. Messrs. 
Duncan and Tedjamulia acted as the officers and directors of the respective corporations. BYU's 
conclusions are based solely on its innuendo and argument. There is no evidence that after 
SoftSolutions, Inc. dissolved, Messrs. Duncan and Tedjamulia acted on its behalf other than as its 
officers to wind-up its dispute with BYU. These individuals never acted for S.T.C. or Tremco, 
respectively, except in their corporate officer capacities. 
The phantomized unincorporated association found by the Court was never named or sued 
as required by Rule 17(d), Utah R. Civil P. The Rule does not create a cause of action against or 
right to sue a fictitious entity. The Rule is merely one of procedure regarding established business 
association relationships. If BYU believed that this "unincorporated association" existed and was 
liable, it should have sued that business association, named it as a party and submitted proof, not 
innuendo. That is what Rule 17(d), Utah R. Civil P., contemplates in order for a court to acquire 
jurisdiction over the alleged association. However, BYU did not sue the association. BYU has only 
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attempted to use the theory to expand its judgment against a corporate debtor to non-parties and 
obtain relief against the non-parties' assets without an opportunity for the non-parties to appear and 
defend the allegations. 
A mere business relationship between entities does not signal an unincorporated association. 
Rule 17 contemplates otherwise. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 895 P.2d 839 (Utah App. 1995) 
held that two property owners did not transact business or hold themselves out for business under 
the common name of the property. In this case, there is no evidence of partnership, joint venture or 
sharing of corporate resources between SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco, or with their officers or 
shareholders. 
Moreover, BYU and the Judgment ignore the express language of Rule 17(d). Even 
assuming there was an unincorporated association (which there is not), the "separate property of an 
individual member of the association may not be bound by the judgment unless the member is named 
as a party and the Court acquires jurisdiction over the member." Rule 17(d), Utah R. Civil P.; see 
also MacKav v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 947 (Utah 1998). Just as in Hardy, there is no evidence here that 
Messrs. Duncan and Tedjamulia, or the limited liability companies, acted in any association or joint 
venture-type relationship. The individuals' actions as officers of the Judgment Debtor, or of S.T.C., 
or even as managers of the stockholders, does not, as a matter of law, subject their assets to liability 
for corporate debts. Even after a corporation is dissolved, the actions of its officers, expressly 
authorized by statute, do not form a basis for an "unincorporated association." 
The district court Ruling allows BYU to satisfy its debt from association assets, but then 
decrees that assets owned by the non-parties are really the "association" assets, all without allowing 
the owner and title-holder of those assets to appear and defend their ownership. In PGM, Inc v. 
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Westchester Investment Partners. 2Q00 UT APP 020,995 P.2d 1252 (Ut. App. 2000), the Utah Court 
of Appeals properly held that res judicata and "issue preclusion" could not preclude PGM, Inc. from 
challenging an alter-ego determination in a prior proceeding to which it was not a party. Similar to 
the instant case, a prior court, in PGM, Inc., had purported to adjudicate the liability of non-party 
PGM as an alleged alter-ego of the Paria Company, "even though PGM was not named, was not 
served, and did not appear in the Paria litigation." 995 P.2d at 1254. In a collateral action by PGM, 
the appeals court affirmed PGM's right to challenge the prior determination of liability as not 
binding upon it. The appellate court relied, in part, upon the United States Supreme Court in Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research. Inc., 395 U.S. 100,110-11, 89 S.Ct. 1562,1569-70 (1969) that: 
"It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam resulting from litigation in which 
he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process." In 
the instant matter, this principle applies equally to the individual assets of the LCs as the 
shareholders of S.T.C. and to the corporate officers. It also makes no difference whether a court's 
power to proceed is in personam or in rem, or whether the legal theory is "alter-ego" or 
"association." The property of Duncan, et al. cannot be taken or adjudicated without making them 
a party and properly stating a claim. 
Applying the same due process principle in reverse, in Hittslev v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 
(Utah 1987) this Court reversed a district court award that substantially benefitted a non-party. 
"Courts can generally make a legally binding adjudication only between the parties actually joined 
in the action." Id. at 1025. See also R.M.S. Corp. v. Baldwin, 576 P.2d 881, 883 (Utah 1998) (No 
judgment could be entered when the corporation was not before the court); and State, ex relHJ, 1999 
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UT APP 238, 986 P.2d 115 (Utah App. 1999) (A grandmother had no notice that a hearing on 
temporary custody would also resolve adoption issues). 
The legal predicates for an unincorporated associations such as a partnership or association 
certainly do not allow the Court to create such an association relationship here as a matter of law and 
without evidence, and then allow seizure of personal assets. The facts that Tremco paid 
SoftSolutions, Inc.'s legal fees or that S.T.C. stockholders sold their stock to WordPerfect do not 
support a "piercing" of the corporate veil and adjudicating liability of officers and shareholders, or 
their assets. There was no evidence before the trial court that the officers/directors of SoftSolutions, 
Inc. continued the business of that corporation outside of directing and managing the BYU litigation. 
SoftSolutions, Inc. was allowed to dissolve because it did not do any business. All software 
business, development or sales were being done by S.T.C. under an assignment. Using BYU's 
theories and the Court's rationale, the LDS Church and BYU's Board of Trustees might well be 
personally liable for BYU's obligations by providing financial support to both and by acting in dual 
governing capacities. 
BYU is availed nothing by.arguing that the individuals and the LCs knew or should be 
imputed knowledge that BYU asserted claims against them or their assets personally. There is no 
showing that they attended any hearing or acted in any capacity other than as corporate officers. 
Jurisdiction over them, personally, or their property is not acquired by their actions as officers or by 
waiver. Attending a hearing as an officer of the defendant corporation when the corporation is the 
only defendant cannot be translated into jurisdiction over or due process against the officer 
personally or his personal assets. 
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BYU disregards the "corporate veil" of SoftSolutions, Inc. by arguing the officers and 
shareholders continued to conduct business by litigating with BYU. However, Utah Code Ann. §16-
10a-1405(1) expressly contemplates a "winding-up" of affairs and the "liquidating" of business for 
dissolved corporations. However, dissolution did not prevent SoftSolutions, Inc. Jfrom suing or being 
sued. Section 16-10a-1405(2). By defending itself in the arbitration and before Ihe district court to 
dispute BYU's royalty claims, SoftSolutions, Inc. did not act beyond its corporate authority, and its 
officers and shareholders did not become an amorphous "unincorporated association." The sales of 
software products and the royalty obligations incurred by S.T.C., as SoftSolutions, Inc.'s "affiliate" 
under the license agreement, as adjudicated in 1998, increased the liability of SoftSolutions, Inc. to 
BYU, but there is no factual or legal basis, alleged or shown, here to substantiate that SoftSolutions, 
Inc. continued to "do business" or acted in "an association." 
Finally, BYU has glibly misrepresented in written and oral arguments that the sale of S.T.C. 
stock was a "distribution of corporate assets" by a dissolved under Utah Code Ann. §§16-10a-
1421(3) and 16-10a-1408(2). S.T.C. was never a "dissolved corporation." Neither SoftSolutions, 
Inc. nor S.T.C. distributed any assets to shareholders. At the time of its 1992 dissolution, 
SoftSolutions, Inc. had no assets and distributed none. At the time of the stock sale in 1994, S.T.C. 
continued to exist with substantial assets, including the reserved fund for the then-unadjudicated 
BYU license liability. The 1994 S.T.C. stock sale to WordPerfect was clearly and unambiguously, 
on its face and in fact, a purchase and sale of the shareholders' stock shares, wherein KWD, AST, 
Julee and the LDS Church sold all their shares in S.T.C. to WordPerfect. (R. 1265.) The conclusory 
characterization that, as a matter of law, the sale was a fraudulent distribution of corporate assets was 
error and without factual basis. That ruling erroneously formed the foundation for the false 
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characterization of the stock sale proceeds as "joint association assets." Even aside from the 
jurisdiction and due process issues, the lower court's ruling that stock sale proceeds were 
"association" assets was in error. 
The Appellant officers and shareholders of SoftSolutions, Inc. and S.T.C. are not liable for 
the coiporate obligation of SoftSolutions, Inc., S.T.C. or Tremco. Their assets cannot be held or 
adjudicated to satisfy the corporate debts of SoftSolutions, Inc. or of Tremco. This Court should 
reverse any judgment in this matter against these Appellants and their assets. 
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CONCLUSION 
Before this Court is a simple case of the individuals' basic rights of due process and the 
application of basic limited liability for corporate debts. 
SoftSolutions, Inc., a Utah corporation, contracted with BYU to license a software algorithm. 
The license was sub-licensed by SoftSolutions, Inc. to a separate but affiliated corporation, S.T.C, 
to be included as one component into a larger product developed by S.T.C. Royalties were paid to 
BYU for a period of time until a dispute arose over whether BYU was fulfilling its part of the license 
contract. 
In 1992, SoftSolutions, Inc., the original licensee, was deemed by the stockholders to not be 
serving any valid purpose, and its corporate charter was allowed to expire. 
In 1996, BYU claimed unpaid royalties against SoftSolutions, Inc., even though the public 
records then showed that SoftSolutions, Inc. was dissolved and had ceased doing business. BYU 
chose not to pursue the affiliated corporation, S.T.C, which had used the license, assumed the 
royalty obligation, and had assets. Ownership of S.T.C. was subsequently sold to WordPerfect 
Corporation and continued as a subsidiary of that corporation for a substantial period. Subsequent 
to the sale of S.T.C stock to WordPerfect, BYU was awarded its Judgment against SoftSolutions, 
Inc. 
All of the corporate entities named are, or were, valid corporate entities recognized by the 
State of Utah when they transacted business. The officers transacted the respective corporate 
businesses within their fiduciary duties. 
28 
After B YU acquired its Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc., it filed another lawsuit against 
a totally different corporation, Tremco. No claim or cause of action was made against Appellants 
Duncan, et al. 
A basic corporate law case has been convoluted into a legal aberration by BYU against any 
entity or person it chooses, regardless of corporate structures and individual rights. BYU advances 
changing theories of "unincorporated association," fraudulent transfer and "sale of corporate assets" 
which are without factual or legal basis in this case. How is this possible? Apparently, in BYU's 
backyard, BYU is king, and the king can do no wrong. 
This Court should hold BYU within the bounds of due process and recognized corporate 
principles. The Judgments and Orders against the non-corporate Appellants and their assets are void. 
The sale of S.T.C. stock was not a fraudulent transfer or "sale of assets." These Appellants did not 
act or do business as some amorphous, unincorporated, loose association. 
The Judgment and Supplemental Order are void and unenforceable as to these Appellants. 
Clark R. Tffelsen ^ - J 
NELSON, CHRISTENSEN & HELSTEN 
Attorney for Appellants and Non-Parties 
Kenneth W. Duncan, Alvin S. Tedjamulia, Lee 
A. Duncan, KWD Associates, L.C., AST 
Associates, L.C., and Julee Associates, L.C. 
DATED this to day of August, 2003. 
Earl Jay \ 
N I E L S E N SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff'Appellant 
SoftSolutions, Inc. 
29 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ffl day of August, 2003,1 served two true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing Brief of Appellant SoftSolutions, Inc. and Appellants and 
Joint Non-Parties Kenneth W. Duncan, Alvin S. Tedjamulia, Lee A. Duncan, KWD Associates, 
L.C, AST Associates, L.C, and Julee Associates, L.C by causing the same to be mailed via 
United States first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Herschel J. Saperstein 
Steven W. Call 
Michael D. Mayfield 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Attorneys for Brigham Young University 
Eric K. Schnibbe 
BERMAN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Attorneys for Tremco Consultants, Inc., 
a.k.a. Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc. 
GJ&tU—^ 
30 
ADDENDA 
_# Description 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405 (2001), Effect of Dissolution 
2. Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1408 (2001), Enforcement of Claims Against Dissolved 
Corporations 
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17, Parties Plaintiff and Defendant 
4. May 15,2002 Ruling Re: 1) Plaintiffs Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial 
Summary Judgment; 2) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; 3) Plaintiffs 
Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim; 4) Plaintiffs Objection to and Motion to 
Strike Affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan; and 5) Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion 
5. June 13, 2002 Judgment 
6. July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order 
7. SoftSolutions. Inc. v. Brigham Young University. 2000 UT 46, 1 P.2d 1095 
Tabl 
REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 1 6 - 1 0 a - 1 4 0 5 
16-10a-1405. Effect of dissolution. 
(1) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not 
carry on any business except t ha t appropriate to wind up and liquidate its 
business and affairs, including: 
(a) collecting its assets; 
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be distributed in kind to its 
shareholders; 
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities; 
(d) distributing its remaining property among its shareholders accord-
ing to their interests; and 
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate its business 
and affairs. 
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property; 
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, although the authoriza-
tion to dissolve may provide for closing the corporation's share transfer 
records; 
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of conduct different from 
those prescribed in Part 8; 
(d) change: 
(i) quorum or voting requirements for its board of directors or 
shareholders; 
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or removal of its directors 
or officers or both; or 
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its articles of incorpora-
tion; 
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corpora-
tion in its corporate name; 
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against the corporation 
on the effective date of dissolution; or 
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of the corporation. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 16-10a-1405, enacted by 
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 156. 
ANALYSIS 
Directors 
—Authority 
Liability after dissolution 
Partnerships 
Trust fund doctrine 
Quiet title action 
Directors. 
—Authority. 
Board of directors m winding up affairs of 
corporation on forfeiture of its charter had 
authority to confess judgment on indebtedness 
of the corporation Hennod v East Tmtic Dev 
Co, 52 Utah 245, 173 P 134 (1918) 
Liability after dissolution. 
Officers and directors who continue the busi-
ness of a suspended corporation which has not 
been reinstated are personally liable for all 
debts and liabilities arising from those opera-
tions tha t are a continuation of the types of 
activities the corporation performed Steenbhk 
v Lichfield, 906 P2d 872 (Utah 1995) (decided 
under former § 16-10-139) 
Persons who act as if pursuant to valid cor-
porate authority, after that authority has been 
suspended, are personally responsible for li-
abilities arising from the continued operations, 
and are jointly and severally liable with others 
who know the corporation's authonty is no 
longer effective but continue its operations 
Steenbhk v Lichfield, 906 P2d 872 (Utah 1995) 
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(6) For purposes of this section, "claim" does not include a contingent 
liability or a claim based on an event occurring after the effective date of 
dissolution. 
History: C. 1953,16~10a~1406. enacted by 
L. 1992, ch. 277, * 157. 
16-10a-1407. Disposition of claims by publication. 
(1) A dissolved corporation may publish notice of its dissolution and request 
that persons with claims against the corporation present them m accordance 
with the notice 
(2) The notice contemplated in Subsection (1) must: 
(a) be published one time in a newspaper of general circulation in the 
county where the dissolved corporation's principal office or, if it has no 
principal office in this state, its registered office is or was last located; 
(b) describe the information that must be included in a claim and 
provide an address at which any claim must be given to the corporation; 
and 
(c) state that unless sooner barred by any other statute limiting actions, 
the claim will be barred if an action to enforce the claim is not commenced 
within five years after the publication of the notice. 
(3) If the dissolved corporation publishes a newspaper notice in accordance 
with Subsection (2), then unless sooner barred under Section 16-10a-1406 or 
under any other statute limiting actions, the claim of any claimant against the 
dissolved corporation is barred unless the claimant commences an action to 
enforce the claim against the dissolved corporation within five years after the 
publication date of the notice. 
(4) (a) For purposes of this section, "claim" means any claim, including 
claims of this state, whether known, due or to become due, absolute or 
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other 
legal basis, or otherwise. 
(b) For purposes of this section, an action to enforce a claim includes 
any civil action, and any arbitration under any agreement for binding 
arbitration between the dissolved corporation and the claimant. 
History: C. 1953,16-10a-1407, enacted by 
L. 1992, ch. 277, *> 158. 
16-10a~1408. Enforcement of claims against dissolved 
corporations. 
A claim may be enforced: 
(1) tinder Section 16-10a-14Q6 or 16-10a~1407 against the dissolved 
corporation, to the extent of its undistributed assets; or 
(2) against a shareholder of the dissolved corporation, if the assets have 
been distributed in liquidation; but a shareholder's total liability for all 
claims under this section may not exceed the total value of assets 
distributed to him, as that value is determined at the time of distribution. 
Any shareholder required to return any portion of the value of assets 
received by him in liquidation shall be entitled to contribution from all 
other shareholders. The contributions ^hall be m accordance with the 
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shareholders'respective rights and interests and may not exceed the value 
of the assets received in liquidation. 
History: C. 1953,16-10a-1408, enacted by 
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 159; 1996, ch. 79, § 17. 
16-10a-1409. Service on dissolved corporation. 
(1) A dissolved corporation shall either: 
(a) maintain a registered agent in this state to accept service of process 
on its behalf; or 
(b) be deemed to have authorized service of process on it by registered 
or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the address of its principal 
office, if any, as set forth in its articles of dissolution or as last changed by 
notice delivered to the division for filing or to the address for service of 
process that is stated in its articles of dissolution or as last changed by 
notice delivered to the division for filing. 
(2) Service effected pursuant to Subsection (1Kb) is perfected at the earliest 
of: 
(a) the date the dissolved corporation receives the process, notice, or 
demand; 
(b) the date shown on the return receipt, if signed on behalf of the 
dissolved corporation; or 
(c) five days after mailing. 
(3) Subsection (1) does not prescribe the only means, or necessarily the 
required means, of service on a dissolved corporation. 
History: C. 1953,16-10a-1409, enacted by 
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 160. 
16-10a-1420. Grounds for administrative dissolution. 
The division may commence a proceeding under Section 16- 10a-1421 for 
administrative dissolution of a corporation if: 
(1) the corporation does not pay when they are due any taxes, fees, or 
penalties imposed by this chapter or other applicable laws of this state; 
(2) the corporation does not deliver a corporate or annual report to the 
division when it is due; 
(3) the corporation is without a registered agent or registered office in 
this state; 
(4) the corporation does not give notice to the division that its registered 
agent or registered office has been changed, that its registered agent has 
resigned, or that its registered office has been discontinued; or 
(5) the corporation's period of duration stated in its articles of incorpo-
ration expires. 
History: C. 1953,16-10a-1420, enacted by 
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 161. 
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msms. 86 A L R Fed 211 Consideration at trial, undei Rule 16 of Fed-
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 16i0 eial Rules of Civil Procedure of issues not fixed 
Federal Rules of Cml Procedure for faibng to for trial m pretrial order 117 \ L R Fed olo 
obe> scheduling or pretrial order 90 A L R 
Fed 157. 
PAKT IV. PARTIES 
Rule 17. Par t ies plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest Every action shall be prosecuted m the name of the 
real party m interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of 
an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been 
made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue m 
that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is 
brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of 
another shall be brought m the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be 
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party 
in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for 
ratification of commencement of the action by or joinder or substitution of, the 
real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have 
the same effect as if the action had been commenced m the name of the real 
party in interest. 
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or more 
persons associated m any business either as a joint-stock company, a partner-
ship or other association, not a corporation, transact such business under a 
common name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they 
may sue or be sued by such common name. Any judgment obtained against the 
association shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the same 
manner as if all had been named parties and had been sued upon their joint 
liability The separate property of an individual member of the association may 
not be bound by the judgment unless the member is named as a party and the 
court acquires jurisdiction over the member 
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a 
nonresident person is associated in and conducts business within the state of 
Utah in one or more places in that person's own name or a common trade name, 
and the business is conducted under the supervision of a manager, superin-
tendent or agent the person may be sued in the person's name in any action 
arising out of the conduct of the business. 
(f) As used in these rules, the term plaintiff shall include a petitioner, and 
the term defendant shall include a respondent. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991, April 1, 1998 ) 
Advisory Committee Note . — Paragraph part (c) the word "minor" has replaced the word 
(d) has been changed to conform to the holding umfant," m order to maintain consistency with 
m Cottonwood Mall Co v Sine, 767 P2d 499 recent changes made m Rule 4(e)(2) In Rule 4 
(Utah 1988), which allows an unincorporated an infant is defined as a person under the age of 
association to sue in its own name The rule 14 years, whereas the intent of Rule 17(c) is to 
continues to allow an unincorporated associa- include persons under the age of 18 years, 
tion to be sued in its own name. The final Amendment Notes . — The 1998 amend-
sentence of paragraph (d) was added to confirm ment added Subdivision (f) 
tha t the separate property of an individual Compiler's Notes . — Subdivisions (a) and 
member of an association may not be bound by (b) of this rule are similar to Rule 17(a) and (c), 
the judgment unless the member is made a F R C P 
party Cross-References . — Guardians, § 75-5-
Techmcal changes m all paragraphs of the 101 et seq 
rule make the terminology gender neutral In Service of process, U R C P 4 . 
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FILED 
Fourth JudiciaJ District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, 1 
a non-profit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TREMCO CONSULTANTS, INC., a/k/a 
TREMCO LEGAL SOLUTIONS, INC., a 1 
Utah Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
RULING Re: 1) PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR DECLARATORY 
RELIEF AND PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT; 2) DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT; 3) PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
| DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM; 
4) PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO 
4ND MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH W. 
DUNCAN; AND 5) PLAINTIFF'S 
RULE 56(f) MOTION 
Civil No. 960400497 
Honorable Fred D. Howard 
District Court Judge 
The above-entitled matter having come before the court on Plaintiff s Motion for 
Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment 1 lefendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Affidavit and 
Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion; and the court having reviewed the motions and the respective 
responses; and the court being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, it now 
makes the following ruling: 
1 
BACKGROUND 
This matter arises from a dispute between the parties ovci royalty agreements entered into 
between Plaintiff and Defendants and SoftSolutions, Inc. As required by the parties' agreements 
the case was heard before an arbitrator and judgment was ultimately entered in favor of the 
Plaintifl The decision of the arbitrator as affirmed by this Court was then appealed to the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 2000 UT 46, 1 
P.3d 1095. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of this Court and the arbitrator's 
award. Following the Utah Supreme Court decision, Plaintiff began a collection proceeding for 
the royalties owed. It is to be noted however, that just prior to the arbitral or s decision, 
SoftSolutions w as dissolved with the subject software assets held by Defendant Tremco. Plaintiff 
seeks Declaratory Judgment against Tremco alleging that Defendant funded the arbitration and 
made affirmative defenses on behalf of SoftSolutions, its sister company. 
On July 17, 2000, the Plaintiff filed its Motion to Dismiss Tremco's Counterclaim and 
Memorandum in Support. The Defendant responded by filing its Motion tor Summary Judgment 
on August 15, 2000, and its Memorandum in Support and in Opposition. The Plaintiff then filed 
its Reply to the above Motion filed by the Defendant and its Motion for Declaratory Relief and 
Partial Summary Judgment and its Memorandums in Support and Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion. On October 16, 2000, Plaintiff filed its rule 56(f) Motion for additional time in which to 
conduct discovery and its Objection to and Motion lo Slnke Affidavit of Kenneth Duncan. The 
Defendant responded on December 4, 2000, filing four Memorandums in Opposition to the 
2 
Plaintiffs Motions. Then on September 7, 2001, the Plaintiff filed its Reply in Support of its 
Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment. Next, on September 14, 2001, 
Plaintiff filed its Reply Memorandums in Support of its Motions for Declaratory Relief, Rule 56(f) 
and to Strike. By the Rule 56(f) Motion, Plaintiff moved that if the affidavit of Mr. Duncan is to 
be considered by the Court, then it requested an extension of time to conduct and respond to 
Defendant's Motion. In the alternative, if its Motion to Strike the affidavit of Mr. Duncan were 
to be granted, Plaintiff waived its Rule 56(f) Motion. Plaintiff then filed its Notice to Submit for 
decision. The parties then argued the issues during a hearing held on April 10, 2002, and the 
Court took the Motions under advisement to issue a written ruling. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Plaintiffs Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
1II its Motion for Declaratory Relief Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Tremco was involved 
in the prior litigation while SoftSolutions was insolvent; and by its involvement it is to be held 
liable for the judgment aw arded against SoftSolutions under a theory of Res Judicata and/or 
Collateral Estoppel. Defendant refutes Plaintiffs claims and seeks summary judgment of 
dismissal contending that the prior litigation was a different case with different parties; and as 
such is not binding upon Defendant. Further, Defendant argues that the indemnity agreement 
entered into between Defendant and S.T.C. does not make Defendant liable foi a judgment 
entered against SoftSolutions. 
3 
The Defendant as Privy to Prior Proceedings 
It is Plaintiffs contention that the final judgment entered against SoftSolutions is binding 
upon Defendant as a matter of law. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was privy to the 
judgment, and that as a factual issue, privity has been established of record; and, therefore the 
Defendant is liable for the judgment. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are 
commonly known as claim preclusion and issue preclusion doctrines. In re General 
Determination of the Rights to the Use ofAll the Water establishes the required elements for both 
issue and claim preclusion. The four elements of issue preclusion are: 
(I) the Defendant must have been a party to or in privity with 
a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the 
prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the 
instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been 
completely, fully and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must 
have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
The three elements for claim preclusion are: 
(I) both cases must involve the same parties, their privies or 
assigns; (ii) the claim sought to be barred either must have 
been presented or have been available to be presented in the 
first case; and (iii) the first suit must have resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendant is liable for the judgment against SoftSolutions because Defendant 
has met all of the requirements of issue and claim preclusion. The Court notes that the parties 
primarily dispute the first requirement of issue and claim preclusion; and therefore, the Court will 
focus its analysis on Plaintiffs assertion that Defendant is liable under a theory of privity. On this 
4 
subject, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "A person is a privy and thereby bound by the final 
order or judgment if the person's interest has or could have been legally represented in the first 
action." In ie General Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d at 70. Further, the 
Restatement of Judgments states that "A person who is not a party to an action but who controls 
or substantially participates in the control of the presentation on behalf of a party is bound by the 
determination of issues as though he were a party." Restatement (Second) of Judgments (second) 
§ 39. The United States Supreme Court has added to the discussion of" privity stating, 
To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their 
adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple 
lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on 
judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent 
decisions. pFN4 omitted] 
These interests are similarly implicated when nonparties 
assume control over litigation in which they have a direct 
financial or propriety interest and then seek to redetermine 
issues previously resolved [FN5 omitted]. As this Court 
observed in Souffront v. Compagnie des Sucreries, 
217 U.S. 475, 486-487, 30 S.Ct 608, 612, 
54 L.Ed. 846 (1910), the persons for whose benefit and at 
whose direction a cause of action is litigated cannot be said 
to be "strangers to the cause. ...[0]ne who prosecutes or 
defends a suit in the name of another to establish and protect 
his own right, or who assists in the prosecution or defense of 
an action in aid of some interest of his own... is as much 
bound ... as he would be if he had been a party to the record." 
SeeSchnellv. PeterEckrich &Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 262, 
n. 4, 81 S.Ct. 557, 559, 5 L.Ed.2d 540 (1961); 
cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 
395 U.S. 100, 111, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 1570, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 
(1969). Preclusion of such nonparties fails under the rubric 
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of collateral estoppel rather than res judicata because the 
latter doctrine presupposes identity between causes of action. 
And the cause of action which a nonparty has vicariously 
asserted differs by definition from that which he subsequently 
seeks to litigate in his own right 
See G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22, 29, 
36 S.Ct. 477, 480, 60 L.Ed. 868 (1916); 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83, comment b, p. 51 
(Tent. Draft *155 No. 2, Apr. 15, 1975); IB Moore P 0.411 [6], 
pp. 1553-1554; Note, Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 
65 Harv.L.Rev. 818, 862 (1952). 
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 at 154 (1979). 
Plaintiff claims that Defendant agreed in writing in the "Tiemco Agi eement "to assume the 
indebtedness owing to the Plaintiff. Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that as a result of that 
agreement the Defendant was the actual party litigating the claims, and was the party who 
undertook the defense of" those claims This it did because at the time the case was being 
litigated, SoftSolutions held no remaining assets, had been dissolved, and was unable to defend 
itself in litigation. By providing SoftSolutions' defense in I he arbitration Defendant was privy to 
the arbitration and the judgment now before the Court. Plaintiff argues that this is because 
Tremco and its officers and directors controlled and paid for the litigation and presented its 
interests in. the prior" litigation * riotes that Defendant makes the statement in the 
indemnity agreement with S.T.C. that they paid SoftSolution's attorney's fees in the prior action. 
The Court is persuaded that as described in Plaintiffs pleadings, Defendant's claims were 
presented, or were available for presentation in the earlier litigation. The Defendant's claims 
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arose as a result of license agreements with Plaintiff in 1987, 1988 and 1990. Any claims 
Defendant may have had should have been considered with the arbitration proceeding of 
September 1996. Defendant asserted defenses in the arbitration on behalf of SoftSolutions and, 
therefore, was privy to the issues. The Court notes the Defendant's arguments that Plaintiff has 
failed to prove Defendant was a party to any agreement to arbitrate; and that the affirmative 
defenses raised were for the winding up of SoftSolutions and not for the benefit of the Defend ant. 
As such, Defendant ai gues they were not and could not have been raised in the arbitration 
proceeding. The Court is unpersuaded by such arguments and concludes that because Defendant 
assumed the litigation for the dissolved SoftSolutions, they were privy to the arbitration. Further, 
the Defendant's claims arose as a result of rights obtained from license agreements SoftSolutions 
entered into with the Plaintiff. The Defendant had ample opportunity pi ior t *»the arbitration 
hearing to assert them which the Defendant failed to do. The Court concludes that the 
Defendant's interest has been legally represented in the first action and that it was privy to the 
prior litigation. As such it is hoiuui bv I ho final judgment 
Defendant as Part of an Association 
In addition to privity, Plaintiff further argues in its Motion that Defendant is pari of an 
association with SoftSolutions and S.T.C. and, therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to enforce its 
judgment against all jointly held assets of SoftSolutions or any proceeds from those assets by the 
attachment of any11 traceable assets or proceeds of SoftSolutions assets in a supplemental order. 
Plaintiff's argument attaches liability to principles who act when SoftSolutions is dissolved. Rule 
7 
17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that: 
...when an association, which is not a corporation, transacts 
business under a common name, whether it comprises the 
names of the members of the association or not, the 
association may be sued by such common name, and the 
judgment obtained against the association shall bind the joint 
property of all the associates in the same manner as though 
all the members of the association had been individually sued. 
Plaintiff asserts that with respect to the final judgment entered against SoftSolutions, that 
litigation was commenced in 1992 after SoftSolutions was dissolved. At that time the Defendant 
was in association with S.T.C, which carried on the business of SoftSolutions, and had created an 
association whereby Defendant would defend the interests of SoftSolutions while S.T.C. would 
carry on the business interests of SoftSolutions. Later, the Defendant and S.T.C. entered into an 
indemnity agreement making Defendant the responsible party for any of Plaintiff s claims pending 
a sale of S.T.C. to WordPerfect. Plaintiff argues that because of the association it is entitled to 
enforce its judgment against any property in which the participants held a joint interest, including 
any proceeds obtained from the sale of S.T.C. to WordPerfect. Defendant maintains that it is not 
part of an association with SoftSolutions and that it does not have a joint interest in any property. 
Specifically, Defendant asserts that it was not a part of an association known as "SoftSolutions 
Association" and that it received or holds no assets in joint interest with either S.T.C. or 
SoftSolutions. 
The Court is persuaded by Plaintiffs argument. It has previously been established in the 
record that Defendant provided the funding for the defense of SoftSolutions in the arbitration. 
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Further, Defendant entered into an indemnity agreement with S.T.C. making itself responsible for 
any of Plaintiff s claims pending a sale of S.T.C. to WordPerfect. It is also undisputed that the 
officers and directors of Defendant were the same officers and directors of SoftSolutions and 
S.T.C. The Court concludes that there is an association present between Defendant, S.T.C. and 
SoftSolutions; and, therefore, because the Plaintiff obtained a final judgment against SoftSolutions 
in an arbitration controlled and financed by the Defendant, Plaintiff as a judgment creditor, may 
recover property in which the participants of the association have a joint interest including, but 
not limited to, proceeds from the sale of the assets of S.T.C to WordPerfect. 
Plaintiff as Third Party Beneficiary 
In addition to its previous legal arguments, the Plaintiff also contends that when a party 
agrees to be responsible for a debt owing to another, such an assumption makes the creditor a 
third-party beneficiary as a matter of law. As a creditor that was specifically named in the 
Defendant's Agreement, the Plaintiff claims to have obtained third-party beneficiary status when 
the Defendant agreed to be solely responsible for the Plaintiffs claims. However, the Defendant 
defends that a third party has no enforceable rights under a contract unless he is intended as a 
beneficiary and that here, the Plaintiff was not such an intended beneficiary. To be an intended 
beneficiary "the intent of the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit must be 
clear." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 
1989). The Court has reviewed the Plaintiffs authority and finds it to be persuasive. The Court 
notes that a plain reading of the agreement states "Tremco consents and acknowledges that 
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Tremco is the responsible party with respect to the BYU claims and is solely responsible for the 
defense and pursuit of claims with respect to that matter." See January 1994 Agreement 
Paragraph C(l). The Court concludes that in the agreement between Defendant and S.T.C, an 
intention to create a benefit for the Plaintiff has been persuasively demonstrated. The agreement 
provided that Defendant would indemnify S.T.C. if that company was ultimately held liable to the 
Plaintiff; and, therefore Plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary of the agreement. 
Plaintiffs Fraudulent Transfer Claim 
Finally, the Plaintiff claims a fraudulent transfer occurred when SoftSolutions assigned its 
rights under the license agreement with the Plaintiff to S.T.C. Under the Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-
1, "a fraudulent transfer is one in which the debtor transfers assets while insolvent for nominal or 
no compensation with the intent to delay, hinder, or defraud the creditor." The undisputed factual 
recital of the pleadings support that SoftSolutions was insolvent at the time it purported to assign 
its contract rights and royalties to S.T.C. Further, because SoftSolutions had no remaining assets 
after the transfer of the license, SoftSolutions did not receive anything of value in exchange for 
the transfer. Plaintiff asserts that inasmuch as Defendant was involved in an association with 
SoftSolutions and S.T.C. and controlled the litigation in which SoftSolutions was involved, by 
such activities it defrauded Plaintiff. The Defendant does not refute the allegation that 
SoftSolutions was insolvent or that SoftSolutions did not receive any value for the transfer. 
However, the Defendant claims that the Plaintiff has failed to show how Defendant is connected 
to this transaction and how such transfer was fraudulent. It is clear however that Defendant 
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controlled SoftSolutions at the time the transfer occurred and that Defendant was associated with 
S.T.C. The Court concludes in the face of Plaintiff s claims, Defendant asserted control over 
SoftSolutions and aided the fraudulent transfer between SoftSolutions and S.T.C. SoftSolutions 
having fraudulently transferred its assets to S.T.C. with S.T.C. later selling those same assets to 
WordPerfect in exchange for valuable proceeds, the Court grants Plaintiff right to levy execution 
on all S.T.C. sale proceeds received by any party having knowledge of Plaintiff s claims prior to 
the sale of S.T.C. to WordPerfect. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs Motion for Declaratory Relief and 
Partial Summary Judgment with right of a supplemental order against SoftSolutions for 
attachment of assets or proceeds of SoftSolutions. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
The Defendant argues that the undisputed facts establish Plaintiff has no valid basis to hold 
the Defendant liable; and, therefore its Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. 
Specifically, the Defendant contends that the arbitration proceeding between the Plaintiff and 
SoftSolutions was a different case and the three separate agreements entered into between 
Plaintiff, SoftSolutions, S.T.C. and Defendant do not render Defendant liable for a judgment 
against SoftSolutions. Plaintiff disputes many of the Defendant's alleged undisputed facts recited 
in support of its Motion. 
The Court has already discussed the question of Defendant's involvement in the original 
case and concluded that the Defendant was privy to the prior litigation. Therefore, by the 
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foregoing conclusion the case between Plaintiff and SoftSolutions was not a separate case from 
the matter now before the Court. 
The Court has also already addressed Defendant's second argument. The Court 
concluded that notwithstanding separate agreements, the Defendant is liable for the agreement 
between SoftSolutions and Plaintiff because it assumed the defense in the arbitration and agreed 
to indemnify S.T.C. against the Plaintiffs claims, therefore, availing itself to be bound by the 
judgment entered against SoftSolutions. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court respectfully denies Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
n. Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim 
The Defendant has filed two counterclaim causes of action in this case. In the first, the 
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff breached the 1988 agreement, and in the second cause, the 
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under 
the 1988 agreement. The Plaintiff claims that the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
bar the Defendant from advancing its counterclaim. The Court notes that it has previously cited 
the elements of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, therefore, the Court will now 
proceed with the analysis of each those elements as they pertain to Defendant's Counterclaim. 
The Court has examined the issue of whether or not the Defendant was privy to the 
previous litigation and has concluded that the Defendant was so. In its previous ruling, the Court 
declared that the three licensing agreements, culminating in the 1990 agreement constituted an 
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exclusive agreement. The arbitrator, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court expressly found that 
the 1990 agreement did not recognize a distinction between Defendant and SoftSolutions, rather 
the agreement treated Defendant and SoftSolutions as a single licensee. Therefore, for reasons 
previously stated the Defendant satisfies the privity requirement of both issue and claim 
preclusion. 
The second element of issue preclusion requires that the issue from the prior adjudication 
be identical to the current issue. The Defendant claims that the issues are not identical because 
the prior adjudication was between Plaintiff and SoftSolutions and not between Plaintiff and 
Defendant, and as such, the issues could not have been raised. However, the Court has already 
concluded that the Defendant was part of the prior adjudication, and, therefore, had the 
opportunity to raise the issue but failed to do so. 
Similarly, the second requirement of claim preclusion requires that the claims should or 
could have been brought in the previous adjudication. The Court concludes that because the 
Defendant was the responsible party that raised various defenses against the Plaintiff and 
controlled the litigation, the counterclaims brought in this action could have been brought in the 
arbitration proceeding. 
The third element of issue preclusion requires that the issues be completely, fully and fairly 
litigated in the first action. Defendant claims that they did not have the time nor the opportunity 
to bring the counterclaims in the arbitration. However, the Court notes that Defendant had four 
full days of arbitration to bring its counterclaims and that the arbitration resulted in a complete 
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decision of all issues presented to the arbitrator. The Court concludes that the issues in the 
arbitration were completely, fully and fairly litigated in the arbitration. 
Finally, in both issue preclusion and claim preclusion there must have been a final 
judgment entered in the first adjudication. The Court notes that the case was adjudicated by an 
arbitrator, affirmed by this Court, and appealed to the Utah Supreme Court where it was affirmed; 
as such, there was a final judgment entered in the first adjudication. 
The Court concludes that each of the elements of both issue and claim preclusion are 
satisfied; and, therefore, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar the Defendant's 
counterclaim. 
In addition to res judicata, the Plaintiff asserts that the statute of limitations has run on the 
Defendant's counterclaim. The Defendant's causes of action for breach of contract and breach of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are governed by a six-year limitation pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. Plaintiff argues that the 1988 agreement was superseded and 
replaced by the 1990 agreement, therefore, the limitation on it began on June 1, 1990. However, 
the Defendant contends that the 1988 agreement and the 1990 agreements are wholly separate 
and, therefore, the counterclaim was in fact timely. The Court agrees with the Plaintiff on the 
statute of limitations issue. As the Court has previously stated, the 1990 agreement replaced the 
1988 agreement, and, therefore, the counterclaim should have been raised prior to June 1, 1990. 
The Defendant requests that if the Court concludes that its counterclaim is time barred, 
that the Court offset Plaintiff s judgment with its counterclaims. Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure provides, "when cross demands have existed between persons under such 
circumstances that, if one had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been 
set up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each other." The 
policy underlying the doctrine in allowing stale defenses to be raised, "is to prohibit a Plaintiff 
from delaying his action until the Defendant's defenses have expired under the applicable statute 
of limitations." Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d at 1069. The Court concludes that in the present 
case the Plaintiff did not delay bringing it's action but timely brought legal action to recover large 
royalties owed to it, and, therefore, the Defendant's request for offset is respectfully denied. 
For the forgoing reasons, the Court grants the Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendant's 
Counterclaims. 
III. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Kenneth Duncan and Plaintiffs 
Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance 
The Plaintiff has moved to strike the affidavit of Mr. Kenneth Duncan arguing that his 
affidavit violates the parol evidence rule, contradicts the trial record, is not based on personal 
knowledge, and contains statements which are inadmissable conclusions. The Defendant disputes 
the Motion. 
First, the Court will examine the allegation that Mr. Duncan's affidavit violated the parol 
evidence rule. When a written agreement, "is unambiguous and clear on its face, extraneous or 
parol evidence should not be admitted." Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983). 
Plaintiff contends that paragraphs 14 and 17 of Mr. Duncan's affidavit violate the parol evidence 
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rule because they contradict the unambiguous terms of the two contracts. Specifically, Plaintiff 
asserts that in paragraphs 14 and 17 Mr. Duncan makes statements that are an inadmissible 
attempt to state the intent of the 1990 and 1994 agreements. The intent of the agreements must 
be inferred from the language of the documents themselves and not from Mr. Duncan's 
statements made years following execution of the agreements. The defendant claims that the 
affidavit did not alter any terms of the contracts and therefore does not violate the parol evidence 
rule. The Court finds that as described by Plaintiff, paragraphs 14 and 17 of the affidavit do 
attempt to alter terms of the contracts which is violative of the parol evidence rule. 
Next, the Plaintiff alleges that the affidavit contradicts the record and the law already set 
forth in this case. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that paragraphs 9, 16 and 21-22 of the Duncan 
affidavit state that Defendant's officers were involved in the arbitration solely in their capacity as 
officer's of SoftSolutions; that the Defendant did not exercise control over the arbitration; and 
that the Defendant first became a party to this lawsuit when Plaintiff brought this collection suit. 
However, the record indicates otherwise. Defendant argues that the record of the previous case is 
not binding on the Defendant because it was not joined in the action. As previously stated, the 
record established in this matter is binding upon SoftSolutions and its privies. The arbitrator and 
this Court held that the 1990 agreement governed the Defendant's rights to use the Dsearch 
Algorythm. Further, the statements in the Duncan affidavit are contradicted by the 1994 
agreement wherein the Defendant admitted that it had "been involved in defending this action and 
has, itself, asserted various claims against the Plaintiff as offsets or absolute defenses." 
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The Plaintiff also contends that the affidavit was not made with the personal knowledge of 
Mr. Duncan. An affidavit "must be made on personal knowledge of the affiant, and set forth facts 
that would be admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein." Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 
1973). Plaintiff alleges that paragraph 16 of Mr. Duncan's affidavit attests to the intent of various 
third party corporate officers who were involved in the arbitration with Plaintiff. The Defendant, 
however, states that he is an officer, and as such, he can attest to what occurred during the 
winding up of SoftSolutions. Plaintiff contends that even if not parol evidence and/or hearsay, the 
affidavit is without proper foundation for Mr. Duncan to testify regarding the intentions and 
motivations of the other officers. The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs argument. The affidavit 
fails to provide a proper foundation for Mr. Duncan to speak of other officers' intentions and 
motivations. 
Finally, the Plaintiff alleges that in his affidavit, Mr. Duncan makes many inadmissable 
legal conclusions. The law is clear, a witness may not testify concerning the law or make legal 
conclusions. Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that the affidavit contains conclusory statements 
in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 15, 17 and 21. Having carefully reviewed the allegations and the 
statements of the affidavit, it is the Court's view that these statements are indeed inadmissable 
conclusions. Such conclusory statements of an affidavit are prohibited as support for a motion. 
For the forgoing reasons, the Court grants PlaintifFs Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
Kenneth Duncan. Plaintiff requested opportunity to argue its Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance 
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if the Court denied its Motion to Strike. Having granted the Motion to Strike, the Plaintiffs Rule 
56(f) Motion for Continuance is moot. 
For the forgoing reasons, and the reasons stated in the pleadings supportive of this 
decision, the Court grants the Plaintiffs Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary 
Judgment; respectfully denies Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; grants Plaintiffs 
Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim; grants Plaintiffs Motion to Strike; and notes 
Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance is moot. Plaintiffs counsel is directed to submit an 
Order to the Court consistent with this Decision. 
DATED this / ^ day of May, 2002. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a non-
profit entity, 
JUDGMENT 
Judgment Creditor and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC., a dissolved entity, 
Judgment debtor, and 
Consolidated Case Nos. 
TREMCO CONSULTANTS, INC., a/k/a 960400497 ancftromeeeSS-
Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc., a Utah 
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. Hon. Fred D. Howard 
On April 10, 2002, a hearing was held in the above captioned case on the pending 
motions before the Court including Brigham Young University's ("BYU") motion for partial 
summary judgment and declaratory relief, BYU's motion to dismiss Tremco Consultant's 
("Tremco") counterclaim and Tremco's cross motion for summary judgment. 
Steven W. Call, Herschel J. Saperstein, Bruce L. Olson and Michael D. Mayfield of Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker appeared on behalf of BYU, and Samuel 0. Gaufin and Eric K. Schnibbe of 
Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic and Savage appeared on behalf of defendant Tremco. Kenneth 
Duncan, Lee Duncan and Alvin Tedjamulia were present in the courtroom but did not make a 
formal appearance on the record. 
The Court having considered the foregoing pending motions on file with the Court, and 
having carefully reviewed the memoranda, documents, exhibits and other materials filed with the 
Court in support and opposition to the pending motions, and having reviewed the stipulation to 
certain facts submitted by the parties, and the Court having made and filed its ruling, dated May 
14, 2002, and for other cause appearing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS ADJUDGES AND 
DECREES as follows: 
1. BYU's motion for summary judgment and declaratory relief is hereby granted. 
2. The Court declares and adjudges that BYU was a third-party beneficiary of the 
written contract made between Tremco and Soflsolutions Technology Corporation ("STC"), that 
Tremco assumed responsibility for the claims owing to BYU, that Tremco was indeed a "privy" 
to the prior litigation between BYU and SoftSolutions, and that Tremco is therefore bound by 
and liable for the 1998 judgment that was made and entered by the Court in that proceeding 
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3. A money judgment is hereby made in favor of BYU and against Tremco, based 
upon the 1998 judgment that was heretofore made and entered in favor of BYU, for the 
foregoing amounts: 
(a) $1,672,467.00 for past royalties owing to BYU; 
(b) interest on the sum foregoing sum at the contract rate of 18% per annum, from 
July 3, 1996, to the date of the entry of that 1998 judgment, and thereafter at the contract 
rate of 18% per annum; 
(c) for attorney's fees awarded as a part of the original arbitration award in the 
amount of $115,000.00; 
(d) interest on the foregoing award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $115,000 
from July 3, 1996 to the date of entry of the 1998 judgment at the rate of 7.61% from July 
3, 1996 to December 31, 1996 at the rate of 7.81% from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 
1997; and at the rate of 7.23% from January 1, 1998 to the date of entry of the 1998 
judgment and thereafter at the legal rate established by Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4; 
(e) for the attorney's fees incurred by BYU at the trial court level on a cost-plus 
basis according to the instructions given by the Utah Supreme Court in its published 
decision entitled SofiSolutions v. BYU, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000); and 
(f) for the attorneys' fees incurred by BYU in connection with the appeal which 
was taken from the 1998 judgment, with the amount of those fees to be determined on a 
cost-plus basis in compliance with the instructions given by the Utah Supreme Court in 
its decision entitled SofiSolutions v. BYU, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000); 
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4. BYU's motion to dismiss Tremco's counterclaim is hereby granted, and the Court 
hereby dismisses Tremco's counterclaim against BYU with prejudice. 
5. Tremco's motion for summary judgment against BYU is hereby denied. 
6. BYU's motion to strike the Affidavit of Kenneth Duncan is hereby granted. 
7. This Judgment shall be augmented by the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred by BYU in the collection of this Judgment pursuant to the award of attorneys' fees 
provided for in the 1998 judgment, which was based upon the attorneys' fees provisions set forth 
in the underlying licensing agreements. 
8. In accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court 
hereby determines that there is no just reason for delay in the entry of this Judgment made 
against Tremco, and therefore the Court hereby instructs the Clerk of the Court to enter this 
Court's Judgment without unnecessary delay. The Court finds that the reasonableness of 
attorneys fees to be determined in Case No. 960400597, on a cost-plus basis as directed by the 
Utah Supreme Court, and the reasonableness of attorneys fees in Case No. 000400088 present no 
just reason for delay in the enforcement of the other terms of this Judgment. 
DATED this / % day of June, 2002. 
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SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC , a dissolved entity, 
Judgment debtor, and 
TREMCO CONSULTANTS, INC., a/k/a 
Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc., a Utah 
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SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
Consolidated Case Nos. 
960400497 and 000400088 
Hon. Fred D. Howard 
On April 10,2002, a hearing was held in the above captioned case on the pending 
motions before the Court including Brigham Young University's ("BYU's") motion for 
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supplemental relief wherein BYU sought a supplemental order to assist it in the collection of the 
money judgment made and entered in favor of BYU by this Court, as modified by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Herschel J. Saperstein, Steven W. Call, Bruce L. Olson and Michael D. 
Mayfield of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker appeared on behalf of BYU, and Samuel O. Gaufin and 
Eric K. Schnibbe of Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic and Savage appeared on behalf of Tremco Legal 
Solutions, Inc. a/k/a Tremco Consultants, Inc. (hereinafter "Tremco"). Kenneth Duncan, Lee 
Duncan and Alvin Tedjamulia were present in the courtroom but did not make a formal 
appearance on the record. 
The Court having considered BYU's motion for supplemental relief sought in connection 
with the collection of the money judgment heretofore made by this Court, as modified by the 
Utah Supreme Court in its decision in the matter of SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young 
University, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000), (hereinafter the "Judgment"), and having carefully 
reviewed the memoranda, documents, exhibits and other materials filed with the Court, and 
being fully aware of the prior rulings, proceedings, orders and judgments made in the case and 
for cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby makes its findings, conclusions and supplemental 
order as follows: 
FINDINGS 
The following facts are determined to be undisputed or established because they have not 
been lawfully controverted or because they have been established by the prior proceedings in the 
case including but not limited to the prior rulings, orders, judgments and decisions made in this 
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case. Some of the findings that relate to the organization of Utah business entities are 
established by public record. 
1. On April 10,2002, BYU's motion for supplemental relief which sought, in part, a 
supplemental order in connection with the enforcement of this Court's Judgment came on for 
hearing before the Court. No opposition to the motion was made by anyone on behalf of 
SoftSolutions, Inc. and therefore the dispositive facts set forth in BYU's memoranda in support 
of the motion are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 4-501 (2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration and/or pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. In 1988, a corporation by the name of KAL, Inc. was organized under Utah law. 
Thereafter, the name of the corporation (hereinafter the "Corporation") was changed to 
"SoftSolutions, Inc." in June of 1989. 
3. Kenneth Duncan, Lee Duncan and Alvin Tedjamulia (hereinafter "Duncan, 
Duncan and Tedjamulia"), owned and controlled the Corporation when it was dissolved as a 
corporate entity on November 1,1992 for failing to comply with Utah law. At no time after its 
dissolution was the Corporation ever reinstated by the Utah Division of Corporations, and the 
time for reinstatement under Utah law has long expired, {see Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1422(1)). 
4. After the involuntary dissolution of the Corporation by the State of Utah, Duncan, 
Duncan and Tedjamulia, the prior shareholders and officers of the Corporation, together with the 
dissolved corporation and STC1, continued to carry on the Corporation's business through the 
1. At all relevant times, Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia were also the officers and 
directors of a company called SoftSolutions Technology Corporation (hereinafter "STC") which 
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use of the Corporation's assets including but not limited to the valuable license rights which the 
Corporation had obtained from BYU under a series of licensing agreements. 
5. At no time after the dissolution of the Corporation were the affairs of the 
Corporation wound-up, nor were its assets liquidated and used to pay the claims owing to BYU. 
Rather, the dissolved Corporation, Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia and STC continued to 
market products under the license agreements which were in the name of the Corporation. 
Indeed, the Judgment made and entered by the Court was based in part upon the royalties which 
were generated by the licenses after the dissolution of the Corporation. 
6. The records of the State of Utah reflect that KWD Associates L.C. was organized 
as a limited liability company by Kenneth Duncan with him as the sole manager and registered 
agent or about November 11, 1993, that Julee Associates L.C. was organized by Lee Duncan, 
with him as the sole manager and registered agent, on or about November 8, 1993, and that AST 
Associates, L.C. was organized as a limited liability company by Alvin Tedjamulia, with him as 
the sole manager and registered agent, on November 2, 1992. (The foregoing limited liability 
companies are herein referred to as the "DDT companies".) 
7. On about January 10,1994, immediately before the sale to WordPerfect, Duncan, 
Duncan and Tedjamulia, who were the officers of Tremco, caused Tremco to make and enter 
into an agreement with STC wherein Tremco agreed to be responsible for the claims owing to 
they also owned and controlled directly, or through the limited liability companies which they 
organized shortly before the sale of STC to WordPerfect. 
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BYU under the licensing agreements. Duncan, Duncan, Tedjamulia and Tremco took full 
control of the litigation concerning the BYU claims. 
8. Shortly after the foregoing agreement was made, Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia 
caused STC together with those assets which had belonged to the Corporation prior to its 
dissolution including but not limited to the licensing rights obtained from BYU, to be sold to 
WordPerfect for several millions of dollars. 
9. In connection with the foregoing sale Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia caused the 
proceeds from the sale to WordPerfect to be paid to the DDT companies, which Duncan, Duncan 
and Tedjamulia organized shortly before the sale. The checks issued by WordPerfect, which 
were produced to BYU by Novel pursuant to subpoena, reflect $13,525,779 in payments to the 
DDT Companies as follows: $8,514,855 to KWD; $1,423,437 to JULEE and $3,587,487 to AST. 
10. Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia did not cause any of the foregoing sale proceeds 
to be used to pay the claims owing to BYU or the Judgment that was made and entered by this 
Court. 
11. In 1996, the unincorporated association, which then consisted of at least Duncan, 
Duncan and Tedjamulia and the dissolved corporation, voluntarily commenced the above 
captioned legal action against BYU in Case No. 960400497. 
12. On July 8, 1998, this Court made and entered its Judgment against the 
unincorporated association in favor of BYU in the amount of $1,672,467, plus interest thereon, 
for attorneys fees of $115,000, plus interest thereon, and for additional attorneys fees in the 
amount of $28,987.50, plus interest thereon. 
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13. Thereafter, the unincorporated association appealed this Court's judgment to the 
Utah Supreme Court, and on May 19,2000, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the Judgment of 
this Court in the matter of SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 
2000), with the exception that the high Court vacated and remanded the award of attorney fees in 
the amount of $28,987.50 with instructions that the reasonableness of the in-house attorneys fees 
incurred by BYU should be determined on a "cost-plus" basis, as described by the Court. The 
Utah Supreme Court also awarded BYU further attorneys' fees which it incurred on appeal with 
the reasonableness of those fees to be determined also on a cost-plus basis. 
14. On or about March 25, 2002, a written stipulation was filed with the Court 
wherein Duncan, Duncan and TedjamuHa admitted that they directed and controlled the litigation 
with BYU, that they were the officers of Tremco, and that Tremco paid the attorneys' fees in 
connection with the BYU litigation. 
15. The Judgment, which was made and entered by this Court as modified by the 
Utah Supreme Court, remains entirely unsatisfied. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
16. Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that "[wjhen two 
or more persons associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other 
association, not a corporation, transact such business under a common name, whether it 
comprises the names of such associates or not, they may sue and be sued by such common name. 
Any judgment obtained against the association shall bind the joint property of all the associates 
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in the same manner as if all had been named parties and had been sued upon their joint liability." 
(Id.) 
17. Based upon the foregoing rule of law, the Court concludes that it should make and 
enter an order that the Judgment heretofore made and entered by this Court is binding upon all of 
the joint property of all associates of the unincorporated association in the same manner as if all 
such associates had been named parties and been sued upon their joint liability. The joint 
property includes all property which the Corporation or the subsequent unincorporated 
association owned including all proceeds obtained from the sale made to WordPerfect by 
Duncan, Duncan & Tedjamulia and/or the DDT companies. 
18. Rule 69(s) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "the Court. . . may 
order any property of a judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in the possession of the 
judgment debtor or any other person, or due to the judgment debtor, to be applied towards the 
satisfaction of the judgment." 
19. Based upon the foregoing rule of law, the Court concludes that it should make and 
enter an order that all property of the unincorporated association and/or any proceeds or benefits 
received therefrom which are in the possession Duncan, Duncan & Tedjamulia, the DDT 
companies, or any other person who had notice of BYU's claims should be applied towards the 
satisfaction of this Court's Judgment. 
20. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408 provides that a judgment against a dissolved 
corporation may be enforced against the shareholders of the dissolved entity if assets have been 
distributed to the shareholders provided that the shareholder's liability under the foregoing 
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section shall not exceed the total value of the assets distribution to them, as that value is 
determined at the time of distribution. 
21. Based upon the foregoing statute, this Court's Judgment may be enforced against 
Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia to the extent of the value of the assets which Duncan, Duncan 
and Tedjamulia received from the Corporation. Those assets include the license rights and 
products which belonged to the Corporation but which Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia caused 
to be transferred to WordPerfect in connection the sale made to WordPerfect for valuable 
consideration. As such, this Court's Judgment may be enforced against Duncan, Duncan and/or 
Tedjamulia to the extent of the value of the assets which they received from the sale made to 
WordPerfect, including the value of the stock and/or the payments which were made to the DDT 
Companies, which Duncan, Duncan & Tedjamulia caused to be organized shortly before the sale 
to WordPerfect. 
22. This Court's Judgment may also be enforced as against all proceeds obtained by 
Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia from the sale made to WordPerfect or against the property 
purchased therewith including but not limited to the approximate $13,525,779 which Duncan, 
Duncan and Tedjamulia caused to be paid to each of the DDT Companies, which Duncan, 
Duncan and Tedjamulia caused to be organized shortly before the sale. 
23. The Utah Supreme Court has held that those who engage in business may be 
jointly and severally liable for the debts of a dissolved corporation. See Murphy v. Crosland, 
915 P.2d 491, 495 (Utah 1996)("[b]ecause Grassland Industries' corporate status was not 
subsequently reinstated, Todd Crossland is personally liable for the default judgment entered 
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against the corporation.") See also Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995), (a person 
who purports to act for and on behalf of a corporation that has no corporate authority is 
personally liable). 
24. Based upon the foregoing case authority, the Court hereby concludes that the 
shareholders of the Corporation, including Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia, are jointly liable for 
the debts and obligations incurred by the unincorporated association. Therefore, the Court 
should order that BYU may levy execution on all of the assets of the unincorporated association 
including but not limited to the proceeds or benefits received by Duncan, Duncan and 
Tedjamulia from the sale to WordPerfect, including but not limited to the money paid to the 
DDT Companies. 
26. For these and other reasons, the Court concludes that it should make and enter a 
supplemental order to assist BYU in the collection of the Judgment that was made and entered by 
this Court on July 7,1998, as that Judgment was modified and affirmed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in its decision entitled SoftSolutions v. BYU, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000). 
ORDER 
Based upon the findings, conclusions, judgments and other proceedings in the case, and 
for cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. BYU's motion, which seeks supplemental relief in connection with the 
enforcement of this Court's Judgment, is hereby granted. 
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2. This Court's Judgment is binding on the joint property of the members of the 
unincorporated association, as if all had been named parties and had been sued upon their joint 
liability pursuant to Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The joint property includes 
all proceeds received from the sale made to WordPerfect or the traceable proceeds obtained 
therefrom including but not limited to the $13,525,779 in money paid by WordPerfect to 
Duncan, Duncan & Tedjamulia or the DDT Companies, which Duncan, Duncan & Tedjamulia 
caused to be organized shortly before the sale. 
3. All property of the unincorporated association, including but not limited to all 
proceeds received from the sale to WordPerfect by Duncan, Duncan & Tedjamulia directly or by 
the DDT Companies, or the traceable proceeds obtained therefrom which is in the possession of 
the judgment debtor, Duncan, Duncan and/or Tedjamulia, the DDT Companies, and/or by any 
other person who had notice of BYU's claims shall be applied to satisfy this Court's Judgment. 
4. This Court's Judgment may be enforced jointly against Duncan, Duncan and 
Tedjamulia, the prior shareholders of the Corporation, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
1408 to the extent of the value of all sale proceeds received by them directly and/or through the 
DDT Companies which they caused to be organized shortly before the sale to WordPerfect. This 
Court's Judgment may also be enforced directly against the sale proceeds paid by WordPerfect to 
Duncan, Duncan and/or Tedjamulia directly or the DDT Companies, and may be enforced 
against the property which has been purchased with the traceable proceeds therefrom. 
5. Any writ of execution or writ of garnishment issued in connection with this 
Court's Judgment and this Supplemental Order shall be accompanied by & Request for Hearing 
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which a person may file with the Court to obtain a heanng before the Court in connection with 
such execution or garnishment. 
DATED this /£) day of C/7f/.Y , 2002. 
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Samuel O. Gaufin 
Eric K. Schnibbe 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Attorneys for Tremco Consultants Inc. 
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Attorneys for Tremco Consultants Inc. 
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Supieme Court of Utah 
SOFTSOLUTIONS INC , Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, Defendant 
and Appellee 
No. 981481. 
May 19,2000 
Software licensee sought declaiatory judgment 
vacating or modifying arbitrator's award to licensor 
m dispute iegaiding royalties foi licensing of search 
engine, and licensor brought motion to confirm the 
award The Distiict Court, Provo Department, Fred 
D Howaid, J , confirmed the award Licensee 
appealed The Supreme Court, Wilkms, J , held 
that (1) as a matter of fust impression, a successful 
litigant who is not pnmanly engaged in providing 
legal sei vices may lecovei attorney fees when 
lepresented by salaried m-house counsel, (2) 
attorney fee for in-house counsel is based on 
cost-plus rate encompassing actual salaries and 
dnect oveihead costs, and (3) award of royalties on 
licensee's sales of products that did not use the 
licensed search engine did not exceed the 
aibitiatoi's authonty 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded 
West Headnotes 
| 1 | Arbitration €=>73.7(1) 
33k73 7(1) Most Cited Cases 
In reviewing the oider of the district court 
confirming, vacating, or modifying an arbitration 
award, the Supreme Court grants no deference to 
the court's conclusions of law, reviewing them for 
conectness 
|2 | Arbitration €=^73.7(1) 
33k73 7(1) Most Cited Cases 
The Supreme Court reviews the district court's 
findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard 
when reviewing the court's order confirming, 
vacating, or modifying an arbitration award 
Page 1 
|3] Arbitration €=>57.1 
33k57 1 Most Cited Cases 
| 3 | Arbitration €=>61 
33k61 Most Cited Cases 
For a court reviewing an arbitration award to 
determine that an arbitrator exceeded his authority, 
a court must (1) review the submission agreement 
and determine that the arbitrator's award covers 
areas not contemplated by the submission 
agieement, oi (2) determine that an award is 
without foundation in reason or fact UCA 1953, 
78-31a-14(l)(c) 
|4| Arbitration €==>57.1 
33k57 i Most Cited Cases 
Arbitrator's rephrasing of submitted issues of what 
amount of royalties was earned under software 
licensing agreement and what amount had been paid 
did not give arbitratoi unbounded jurisdiction to 
determine any issue relating to royalties, and thus, 
arbitrator did not exceed his authority 
(5| Arbitration €=>57.1 
33k57 1 Most Cited Cases 
Arbitrator's award of royalties on software licensee's 
sales of products that did not contain the licensed 
search engine was within scope of submitted 
questions regarding amount of royalties due and 
whether use of the intellectual property 
discontinued so that potential royalties stopped 
accruing 
|6| Arbitration €==>61 
33k61 Most Cited Cases 
Arbitrator's determination that software licensor 
was entitled to royalties on licensee's sales of 
products that did not contain the licensed search 
engine, because licensee deprived licensor of 
potential royalties by discontinuing use of the 
search engine in its products, was a rational 
interpretation of the software licensing agreement 
|7 | Copyrights and Intellectual Property €=^107 
99k 107 Most Cited Cases 
Software licensee's affiliated company remained an 
"affiliate" of the licensee, within meaning of 
Copr © West 2003 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works 
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software licensing agreement entitling licensor to 
royalties on sales by licensee's affiliates, after sale 
of control of the affiliated company to a third party. 
|8| Arbitration €==>57.1 
33k57.I Most Cited Cases 
Arbitrator's award of royalties on sales by licensee's 
affiliate, after sale of control of the affiliated 
company to a third party, was within scope of 
submitted issue of the amount of royalties owed to 
licensor. 
|9| Arbitration €=>61 
33k61 Most Cited Cases 
Arbitrator rationally interpreted software licensing 
agreement as allowing the parties to waive the 
one-year contractual limitations period through their 
conduct, though another provision of the agreement 
required modifications or waivers to be in writing. 
110| Arbitration €=>57.1 
33R57.1 Most Cited Cases 
Arbitrator's award of royalties after purported 
automatic termination of software licensing 
agreement based on licensee's ceasing to carry on 
its business was within scope of submitted questions 
regarding amount of royalties due and whether use 
of the licensed search engine in licensee's products 
was discontinued so that potential royalties stopped 
accruing. 
1111 Arbitration €=>61 
33R61 Most Cited Cases 
Arbitrator rationally • .:--;piei<.~ automatic 
termination provision < software licensing 
agreement, which by its terms was applicable if 
licensee ceased to carry on its business, as being 
inapplicable where licensee discontinued its use of 
the licensed search engine in its products, thereby 
depriving licensor of potential royalties. 
' i l. \ ri-itration C=>61 
33K61 Most Cited Cases 
Arbitrator gave a rational interpretatioi i to 
automatic termination provision of software 
licensing agreement, which was applicable if 
licensee's sale of its business transferred the license 
Page 2 
without licensor's written consei it, as not 
terminating licensor's right to receive royalties, 
where licensee failed to return the licensed search 
engine technology and licensor had no notice of 
licensee's sale of a controlling interest in licensee's 
affiliate, 
113 j Costs €=> 194.32 
102k 194.32 Most Cited Cases 
If a contract provides for attorney fees, the award is 
allowed only in accordance with the terms of the 
contract. 
114) Arbitration €=>42 
33k42 Most Cited Cases 
Software licensor, which was not an organization 
primarily engaged in providing legal services, was 
entitled to recover contractual attorney fees for its 
use of its salaried in-house counsel in an arbitration 
proceeding regarding a royalty dispute with 11 -
1151 Costs €=>l 94.46 
102kl 94.46 Most Cited Cases 
A successful litigant who is not primarily engaged 
in providing legal services may recover attorney 
fees when represented by salaried in-house counsel 
116| Costs €=> 194.18 
102k 194.18 Most Cited Cases 
A cost-plus rate encompassing actual salaries and 
direct overhead costs, rather than the fair market 
value for similar services from a comparably 
experienced outside lawyer, is the more reasonable 
measure of attorney fees to in-house counsel. 
|17| Costs €^194.10 
102k 194.10 Most Cited Cases 
I he basic purpose of attorney fees is to indemnify 
the prevailing party, not to punish the losing party 
by allowing the winner a windfall profit, 
|18| Costs €=> 194.18 
102k 194.18 Most Cited Cases 
Attorney fees for in-house counsel are limited to 
consideration actually paid or for which the party is 
obligated, calculated using a cost-plus rate and 
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taking into account: (1) proportionate share of the 
party's attorney salaries, including benefits, which 
are allocable to the case based upon the time 
expended, plus (2) allocated shares of the overhead 
expenses, which may include the costs of office 
space, support staff, office equipment and supplies, 
law library and continuing legal education, and 
similar expenses. 
119] Costs €==>207 
102k207 Most Cited Cases 
The party seeking recovery of attorney fees for 
in-house counsel has the burden of proving the 
amounts used to >: '^ ::-.:,v. cost-plus rate for 
counsel. 
[20| Arbitration €=^>42 
33k42 Most Cited Cases 
Arbitrator reasonably applied attorney fee 
provisions in software licensing agreement when 
awarding attorney tees for licensor's use of its 
in-house counsel, though the arbitrator failed to 
calculate attorney fees under a cost- plus rate 
encompassing actual salaries and direct overhead 
costs. 
|21| Arbitration €=>42 
33k42 Most Cited Cases 
District court abused its discretion by failing to 
calculate attorney fees under a cost-plus rate 
encompassing actual salaries and direct overhead 
costs, when making attorney fee award to software 
licensor for licensor's use of its in-house counsel in 
post-arbitration proceedings. 
|22| Appeal and Error C=?984(5) 
30k984(5) Most Cited Cases 
Appellate court reviews the district court's award of 
attorney fees under an abuse of discretion standard. 
*1097 Earl Jay Peck, Clark R. Nielsen, David B. 
Hartvigsen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff, 
Eugene H. Bramhall, David B. Thomas, Provo, for 
defendant. 
WILKINS, Justice: 
Copr. © \\ • .• M< : fc 
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"I 1 Appellant Softsolutions, Inc., appeals from an 
order of the district court denying its motion to 
vacate or modify an arbitration award and granting 
appellee Brigham Young University's (BYU) 
motion to confirm the arbitration award. We affirm 
the district court's order confirming the arbitration 
award, but we remand the case to the district court 
to recalculate its award of attorney fees in light of 
this opinion. 
f 2 This case arises as a result of a series of 
software licensing agreements entered into between 
1987 and 1990 by BYU and Softsolutions, the last 
of which was executed on June 1, 1990 (the 
Agreement). The Agreement provided that BYU 
would give Softsolutions an exclusive license to use 
its software technology called D-Search in 
exchange for royalty payments. The Agreement 
mandated mediation followed by arbitration for 
resolution of any contractual disputes. 
% 3 The arbitration provision of the Agreement 
expressly set forth the scope of the arbitrator's 
powers and prohibited the arbitrator from "add[ing] 
to, subtracting] from or modifying] any of the 
terms or conditions'1 of the Agreement. [FNl] The 
Agreement provided that in the event of arbitration, 
the prevailing party was to "be paid by the other 
party - a reasonable sum for attorneys' fees and 
costs." Another provision of the Agreement *1098 
also provided that Softsolutions was to "pay all 
reasonable collection costs at any time incurred by 
BYU in obtaining payment of amounts past due, 
including court costs, expenses associated with 
litigation, and reasonable attorneys' fees, whether or 
not suit was commenced by BYU." 
FNl. Paragraph 15.1 of tl le Agreement 
provided in part: 
Except as to issues relating to the validity, 
construction or effect of any patent 
licensed, the parties must, with respect to 
any and all claims, disputes or 
controversies arising under, out of, or in 
connection with this Agreement, attempt in 
good faith to resolve those claims, disputes 
or controversies by negotiations between 
the parties. In the event either party 
believes the negotiation discussions are not 
1 P.3d 1095 Page 4 
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likely to result in settlement, the parties 
must, in good faith, participate in 
mediation sessions with a mediator to be 
mutually selected by the parties and the 
expense of which is to be paid 50 percent 
by each party. In the event, after one or 
more mediation sessions, either party 
believes the mediation process is not likely 
to resolve the dispute by mutual 
agreement, the dispute shall he resolved by 
final and binding arbitration in Provo. 
Utah. Each party shall choose one 
arbitrator and these two arbitrators shall in 
turn select a third arbitrator, which three 
arbitrators shall constitute the arbitration 
panel. The arbitrators shall have no 
power to add to, subtract from or modify 
any of the terms or conditions of this 
Agreement. 
(Emphasis added.) 
U 4 Almost immediately after the Agreement was 
executed and Softsolutions began using D-Search, a 
dispute arose between the parties concerning 
various competitors infringing on the patented 
software. When negotiations failed, the matter was 
submitted to mediation, as required by the 
Agreement. In July 1993, Softsolutions removed 
D-Search from its products and replaced it with 
another technology. In January 1994, WordPerfect 
purchased the stock of Softsolutions Technology 
Corporation (STC), an affiliate of Softsolutions, 
WordPerfect was later acquired by Novell. 
1| 5 In February 1994, BYU initiated arbitration 
proceedings. In preparation for the arbitration, 
counsel for both parties prepared and submitted to 
the arbitrator a joint statement of issues to be 
arbitrated (the Submission Agreement). 
Arbitration ensued, and in July 1996, the arbitrator 
entered his arbitration award, granting BYU 
$1,672,467 in royalties and $115,000 in attorney 
fees. The award gave BYU royalties on -sales made 
prior to March 1996. In his decision, the arbitrator 
described the issues submitted for arbitration in a 
fashion different from that included in the 
Submission Agreement of the parties. 
K 6 Thereafter, Softsolutions filed an action for 
declaratory judgment in the district court seeking to 
have the arbitration award vacated or modified 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-14(l)(c) and 
78-3 la- 15(l)(b) (1996). Softsolutions claimed 
that the arbitrator exceeded the powers granted to 
him under the terms of both the Agreement and the 
Submission Agreement or, alternatively, had based 
the award on matters not submitted to him. In 
response, BYU filed a motion with the court to 
confirm the arbitration award pursuant to section 
78-3la-12 of the Utah Code. The parties then 
stipulated to consolidate the actions and agreed that 
the two motions would be treated as cross-motions. 
11 7 On February 10, 1998, the district court 
denied Softsolutions' motion to vacate or modify the 
arbitrator's award, ruling that the arbitrator did not 
exceed his powers or base the award on a matter not 
submitted by the parties for arbitration. In so 
ruling, the district court adopted the arbitrator's 
description of the arbitrable issues. The district 
court granted BYU's motion to confirm the 
arbitration award, relying on Utah Code Ann. § 
78-3la-12 (1996). The district court subsequently 
entered its judgment on July 7, 1998, awarding 
BYU $28,987.50 in additional attorney fees for the 
work of its in-house counsel in the action before the 
district court. The court based this calculation on 
what it determined was the current market rate of 
$150 per hour charged by attorneys engaged in 
similar private practice. The entire award 
including the. additional attorney fees totaled 
$1,816,454.50, plus interest. Softsolutions appeals. 
ISSUES AND M ' S N I U K D S 1 H> MV li .">', 
1] 8 Softsolutions presents two issues on appeal. 
First, it argues that the district court erred in 
denying its motion to vacate or n lodify the 
arbitration award because the arbitrator exceeded 
his jurisdiction by arbitrating matters not included 
in the parties' Submission Agreement oi the 
Agreement. 
H 9 Second, Softsolutions argues that the district 
court improperly awarded attorney fees to BYU for 
its in-house attorneys. Specifically, it argues that 
the attorney fees are non-recoverable as a matter of 
law, but that even if they are recoverable, the 
amount awarded is excessive and unreasonable. 
K 10 "1 o a significant degree, our decision turns on 
application of the correct standard of review by the 
district court and by this court in reviewing the 
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1 P.3d 1095 
396 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 2000 UT 46 
(Cite as; I P.3d 1095) 
district court's decision. There are two standards 
applicable to the review of arbitration awards. In 
Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Sail Lake Trappers, Inc., 
925 P.2d 941, 947-48 (Utah 1996). we described 
both the standard to be applied by the district court 
and that to be used by an appellate court to review 
the district court's *1099 proceedings. The 
standard of review for a trial court "is an extremely 
narrow one" giving " 'considerable leeway to the 
arbitrator,' " and setting aside the arbitrator's 
decision " 'only in certain narrow circumstances.' " 
Id. at 947 (quoting First Op/ions v. Kaplan, 514 
U.S. 938, 943, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 131 L.Ed.2d 
985 (1995)). The trial court "may not substitute its 
judgment for that of the arbitrator, nor may it 
modify or vacate an award because it disagrees with 
the arbitrator's assessment." Id. 
fj J J When, as here, the award is challenged on 
the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his or her 
authority, the trial court applies a two-pronged test. 
First, "to find that an arbitrator has exceeded his 
authority, a court must review the submission 
agreement and determine whether the arbitrator's 
award covers areas not contemplated by the 
agreement." Id. at 949, 115 S.Ct. 1920. If not, 
there is one additional limited circumstance under 
which the arbitrator's award may have exceeded his 
authority. The second prong to be applied by the 
trial court is to determine whether an award is " 
'without foundation in reason or fact.' " 'id. at 950, 
115 S.Ct. 1920 (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. 
Trainmen v. Central Ga. Ry, 415 F.2d 403, 411-12 
(5th Cir. 1969)). This second prong is referred to 
as the "irrationality principle" and is based on the 
"assumption ... that the parties, by their agreement 
to arbitrate, have given the arbitrator the authority 
to decide their dispute on a rational basis." Id. 
[1][2] ^ 12 In reviewing the order of the district 
court confirming, vacating, or modifying an 
arbitration award, we grant no deference to the 
court's conclusions of law, reviewing them for 
correctness. We review the district court's findings 
of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. More 
specifically, our "scope of review is limited to the 
legal issue of whether the trial court correctly 
exercised its authority in confirming, vacating, or 
modifying an arbitration award." Intermountain 
Power Agency v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 961 P.2d 
320, 323 (Utah 1998). Additionally, "[wjhether 
attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a 
Page 5 
question of law, which we review for correctness." 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 
1998). However, the district court has "broad 
discretion in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable fee, and we will consider that 
determination against an abuse-of-discretion 
standard." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 
985,991 (1 Itah 1998) 
ANALYSIS 
! • : '^RATION AV "' 
% 13 Softsolutions maintains that the district court 
should have vacated or modified the arbitration 
award based upon either of two statutory grounds: 
the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78- 31a-14(l)(c) (1996), or 
the arbitrator based the award on a matter not. 
submitted to him, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
78-31a-15(l)(b) (1996). Under both grounds, 
Softsolutions argues that the arbitrator erred by (1) 
rephrasing and essentially enlarging the first issue in 
the Submission Agreement, (2) awarding royalties 
on sales of Softsolutions' software products that did 
not contain D-Search technology, (3) awarding 
royalties on software sales made by non-afflliates of 
Softsolutions, (4) disregarding the one-year 
limitation period in the Agreement, and (5) 
awarding royalties on software sales made after the 
Agreement had automatically terminated by its own 
terms..Softsolutions maintains that any one of these 
errors standing alone was a sufficient basis for the 
district court to either vacate or modify the award. 
H 14 Hie Utah Arbitration Act, §§ 78-31 a-1 to -20 
(the Act), governs the arbitration process. "The Act 
supports arbitration of both present and future 
disputes and reflects long-standing public policy 
favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of 
adjudicating disputes." Allred v. Educators Mitt. 
Ins. Ass'n of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996) 
"[T]he standard for reviewing an arbitration 
award is highly deferential to the arbitrator." Buzas, 
925 P.2d at 946; see also Intermountain Power 
Agency, 961 P.2d at 323. Generally, " 'an 
arbitration award will not be disturbed ... because 
the court does not agree with the award as long as 
the proceeding was fair and honest and the 
substantial rights of the parties were respected.' " 
*1100Buzas, 925 P.2d at 947 (quoting DeVore v. 
IHC Hosps., Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994) 
). Moreover, "[g]iven the public policy and law in 
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support of arbitration, judicial review of arbitration 
awards confirmed pursuant to the Act is limited to 
those grounds and procedures provided for under 
the Act" Alfred, 909 P.2d at 1265. 
[3] U 15 Under the Act, a court must vacate an 
arbitration award if it appears that "the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-31a-14(l)(c) (1996). For a court reviewing an 
arbitration award to determine that an arbitrator 
exceeded his authority, a court must (1) review the 
submission agreement and determine that the 
"arbitrator's award covers . areas not contemplated 
by the submission agreement," or (2) determine that 
an award is " 'without foundation in reason or fact.' 
" Buzas, 925 P.2d at 950 (two-pronged Buzas test) 
(quoting R.R. Trainmen, 415 F.2d at 41i- 12); see 
also Intermountain Power Agency?, 961 P.2d at 323 
("Whether the court agrees with the arbitrator's 
judgment is irrelevant, as long as the arbitrator 
construed and applied the contract in an arguably 
reasonable manner and acted fairly and within the 
scope of his authority,"'). [FN2 ] 
FN2. In Intermountain Power Agency, we 
stated: 
[A]n arbitrator exceeds his or her powers if 
the arbitrator strays beyond the scope of 
the questions submitted for arbitration by 
the parties. The scope of the parties' 
dispute as defined in their written 
agreement to arbitrate establishes the 
scope of the arbitrator's authority in 
resolving the conflict. An arbitration 
awarding purporting to resolve questions 
beyond that jurisdictional boundary is not 
valid. For a court to find that an arbitrator 
has exceeded his or her delegated 
authority, the court must determine that 
"the arbitrator's award covers. areas not 
contemplated by the submission 
agreement." In addition, an arbitrator 
exceeds his or her delegated power if the 
arbitration award has no " 'foundation in 
reason or fact' " and is, therefore, " 
'completely irrational.'" 
961 P.2d at 323 (citations omitted). 
|^ 16 1he Act requires a court to modify an 
arbitration award if it appears that "the arbitrators' 
C o m 'i W V N ~(JI — ' ,. . 
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award is based on a matter not submitted to them, if 
the award can be corrected without affecting the 
merits of the award upon the issues submitted." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-15(l)(b) (1996). We 
now address Softsolutions' claims of error under 
these statutory grounds. 
A. Rephras ing of th e Subm iss ion Agreem ent 
[4] 1| 17 First, Softsolutions argues that the district 
court erred in refusing to vacate or modify the 
award because the arbitrator erroneously recast the 
eight issues submitted to the arbitrator. 
Softsolutions argues that by restating the first and 
primary issue submitted for decision, the arbitrator 
improperly obtained unfettered jurisdiction to 
determine any matter relating to royalties, whether 
based upon the contract or not. In other words, 
Softsolutions argues that the arbitrator exceeded the 
scope of his jurisdiction by deleting terms and 
modifying others to add royalty obligations not 
found within the terms of the Agreement We 
disagree. 
•fl 18 The first issue charged the arbitrator with 
determining: "What amount of royalties were 
earned under the D-Search licensing agreement(s) 
with BYU; and what amount has been paid?" The 
arbitrator refrained this question into "What amount 
of royalties are due BYU by Softsolutions, Inc.?" 
The district court also adopted this wording. We 
are not convinced that the rephrasing of this issue, 
or any other presented for our review, gave the 
arbitrator "unbounded jurisdiction" to determine 
any issue relating to the royalties, as Softsolutions 
suggests. Rather, the arbitrator stayed within the 
confines of the first question submitted for 
resolution. Specifically, the arbitrator stated that 
"Softsolutions is indebted to BYU in the amount of 
$1,672,467" as a result of the D-search technology, 
and that Softsolutions did not make royalty 
payments as dictated in the contract. This ruling, 
although framed differently than the question 
submitted for resolution, certainly addresses what 
royalties were earned and the amount paid by 
Softsolutions. Because the arbitrator ruled on the 
matter submitted for resolution and did not stray 
from the scope of authority delegated to him by the 
parties, this challenge presents no basis to vacate or 
modify the arbitration award. 
• - - M-. // d o* Royalties on Software Products 
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that Did Not Contain D-
Search Technology 
[5][6] "J] 19 Second, Softsolutions argues that the 
district court erred in refusing to vacate or modify 
the award because, despite finding that 
Softsolutions discontinued D-Search in July 1993, 
the arbitrator erroneously imposed royalties on the 
sale of Softsolutions' products that did not contain 
D-Search technology, contrary to the express terms 
of paragraph 4.1 A of the Agreement. 
\ 20 Paragraph 4.1 A of the Agreement provided 
that Softsolutions was obligated to pay BYU 
[a]n earned royalty in an amount equal to five (5) 
percent of the Net Sales of the Licensed Products 
or Licensed Processes used, leased or sold by or 
for Softsolutions and its Affiliates, including 
packaged software products, custom software 
applications containing the Licensed 
Process(es) and the support of custom software 
applications ... containing the Licensed 
Process(es). 
Accordingly, under the Agreement, royalties were 
imposed only on Softsolutions' products which 
actua! 1 y co nta i ned D- Search tech n o 1 ogy. 
1] 21 One question submitted by the parties read: 
"Was use of D-Search discontinued so that potential 
royalties stopped accruing? If so, when?" Another 
question read: "What amount of royalties were 
earned under the D- Search licensing agreement(s) 
with BYU; and what amount has been paid?" The 
arbitrator concluded: "Softsolutions did not need to 
replace the technology of D-Search; therefore, 
Softsolutions could not avoid royalty payments by 
using a substitute search engine. D-Search was 
capable of performing if Softsolutions fully 
understood the technology of D-Search and 
implemented the technology accordingly." As 
such, the arbitrator awarded BYU royalties on sales 
of Softsolutions' software which did not contain 
D-Search technology. 
\ 22 Softsolutions argues (1) that the 
jurisdictional question limited the arbitrator's 
authority only to deciding whether the use of 
D-Search was discontinued so that potential 
royalties stopped accruing and when, and (2) that by 
awarding royalties from the sales of products not 
containing D-Search, the arbitrator ignored both the 
Submission Agreement and sections 4.1 and 15.1 of 
Copr. © West 2003 N< > Clain 11< > 
Page 7 
the Agreement. 
1] 23 In refusing to vacate the awai d. the disti id: 
court reasoned: 
Under the License Agreement-Paragraph 3.1, 
"Softsolutions shall, during the term of this 
agreement, use its best efforts to bring one or 
more Licensed Products or Licensed Processes to 
the market through a thorough, vigorous and 
diligent program designed to commercially 
develop the Licensed Technology to its full 
market potential." Given an express 
contractual duty to use D- Search under the 
Exclusive License Agreement and a finding that 
Softsolutions did not need to replace D-Search, 
an award on sales which should have contained 
D-Search is not irrational and is derived in a 
logical way from the wording of the contract. 
Additionally, the court finds an award of royalties 
on sales after July, 1993 falls squarely within the 
questions submitted by both parties in the Joint 
Statement of Issues to be Arbitrated by Arbitrator 
Rokich. Ihe questions submitted included a 
question as to the amount of royalties due BYU 
by Softsolutions, Inc., and the arbitrator was 
specifically charged with determining whether the 
use of the intellectual property discontinued so 
that royalties stopped accruing. 
(Emphasis omitted.) 
|^ 24 .We conclude that the district court properly 
applied the two-pronged test in Buzas in 
determining whether to vacate the arbitration award 
on this basis. Certainly, the issue of whether to 
award royalties on sales before or after D-Search 
was removed falls within the ambit of issues 
submitted by the parties for resolution—that is, the 
questions regarding the amount of royalties BYU 
earned as well as whether the D-Search was 
discontinued. Moreover, the award is based on a 
rational interpretation of the Agreement. As such, 
the district court did not err in refusing to vacate the 
award under section 78-3 la-14(l)(c). 
Additionally, the district court properly refused to 
modify the award *1102 under section 
78-31 a-15( 1 )(b), as this issue was submitted for 
decision. 
C. Royalties on Software Sales Made After the 1994 
Stock Sale 
'- 2 f nrv:. Softsolutions argues that the 
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district court erred in refusing to vacate or modify 
the award because the arbitrator ignored express 
provisions in the Agreement by awarding S935,000 
in royalties on software sales made by 
"non-affiliates" of Softsolutions. namely, 
WordPerfect and Novell. Essentially, Softsolutions 
argues that royalties on sales by WordPerfect and 
Novell were not "earned" under paragraph 4.1 A of 
the Agreement because these companies were not 
"affiliates" of Softsolutions, as defined by 
paragraph 1.1 of the Agreement. Softsolutions 
maintains that its royalty obligations ceased when 
STC, an affiliate of Softsolutions, was purchased by 
WordPerfect on January 24, 1994, and was later 
acquired by Novell. However, STC remained an 
"affiliate" even after the sale of control of STC to 
WordPerfect and eventually to Novell, 
*,| 26 Furthermore, the parties' Agreement 
described which sales were subject to royalties. 
Paragraph 2.1 of the Agreement provided: 
BYU hereby grants ... Softsolutions the ... right 
and license to utilize the Licensed Technology, 
specifically identified as D-Search ... until such 
time as this agreement is terminated. This grant 
will extend to the manufacture, sale, lease, 
transfer or other disposition of Licensed Products 
or Licensed Processes through an Affiliate. 
T| 27 Paragraph 4.1 A of the licensing agreement 
provided that "Softsolutions shall pay to BYU an 
'earned' royalty in the amount of five (5) percent of 
the Net Sales of the Licensed Products or Licensed 
Processes used, leased or sold by or for 
Softsolutions and its Affiliates" 
[8] \ 28 In denying Softsolutions' motion to 
vacate the arbitrator's award, the district court 
considered the two factors set forth in Buzas. ft 
determined that the first prong in Buz as was met 
because one of the issues to be arbitrated was the 
amount of royalties Softsolutions owed to BYU. It 
found that an award based on royalties before or 
after January 24, 1994, was well within this 
question. Moreover, the court found that award 
was not "irrational or inconsistent" with the wording 
of the Agreement to award royalties. 
Tl 29 We agree with the district court that there is 
no basis to vacate the award under section 
78-31a-14(l)(c) of the Utah Code. The arbitrator 
clearly stayed within the confines of the Submission 
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Agreement, and his ruling had a foundation in 
reason and fact. Therefore, the district court did 
not err in determining that the arbitrator did not 
exceed his powers. Moreover, we agree with the 
district court that because this matter falls within the 
issues submitted for arbitration, there was no basis 
for the district court to modify the award under 
section 78-31a-l 5(1 )(b) of the Utah Code. 
D. One-Year Contractual Limitation Period 
% 30 Fourth, Softsolutions contends the district 
court erred in refusing to vacate or modify the 
award because the arbitrator essentially modified, 
subtracted from, and added to the terms of the 
Agreement by finding that the parties waived 
paragraph 12.5 of the Agreement, which terminated 
all of BYU's claims not brought within one year 
after discovery of the cause of action. Specifically, 
Softsolutions argues that because BYU brought the 
arbitration action on February 4, 1994, all royalties 
accruing before February 1993 should be barred by 
the one-year limitation period, as mandated by 
paragraph 12.5 of the Agreement, and that in 
finding that the parties waived the one-year 
provision, the arbitrator improperly disregarded 
paragraph 20.6 of the Agreement, which explicitly 
requires all modifications or waivers of the 
Agreement to be in writing. 
|^ 31, The Agreement provided: "No action., 
regardless of form, arising out of the transaction 
subject of this Agreement may be brought by either 
party more than one year after the cause of action is 
discovered." The Agreement further said: "No 
modification or claimed waiver of any of the 
provisions of this Agreement shall be valid unless in 
writing * 1103 and signed by authorized 
representatives of the party against whom such 
modification or waiver was sought to be enforced." 
Moreover, paragraph 15.1 of the Agreement 
provides that the arbitrator "shall have no power to 
add to, subtract from or modify any of the terms or 
conditions of this Agreement." 
T[ 32 The parties' Submission Agreement charged 
the arbitrator with determining whether "BYU's 
claims for royalties due [were] barred by a 
contractual limitation period[.] If so, what is the 
period and when does it begin to run?" In 
answering this question and in determining the 
amount of earned royalties, the arbitrator found that 
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the parties, by their own conduct, had waived the 
one-year contractu a 1 i i in. itat i on period, I Ih e 
arbitrator stated: 
[T]he contractual limitation period was waived by 
BYU and Softsolutions because of their ongoing 
negotiations to resolve the written complaints 
raised by Softsolutions. It was evident to the 
arbitrator from the evidence, exhibits, testimony 
and the conduct of the witnesses that the 
contractual limitation period should not bar BYU 
from collecting royalty payments that are found to 
be due and owing. 
The arbitrator did not address the written waivei 
requirement of paragraph 20.6. 
1] 33 In determining whether to vacate the award 
based on this alleged error, the district court applied 
the two-pronged test in Buzas. The court 
determined that the first prong in Buzas was met 
because the parties submitted the contractual 
limitation issue to the arbitrator. We agree that the 
court did not exceed its authority on this basis. In 
considering the second prong of Buzas, whether the 
arbitrator's actions were "without foundation in 
reason or fact," the district court said: 
The court recognizes the standard set forth in 
Buzas is that the arbitrator cannot add to, 
subtract from or modify any terms of the License 
Agreement. In this case, however, the arbitrator 
found that the parties (BYU and Softsolutions) 
themselves by their own conduct modified/waved 
[sic] the License Agreement, and this court may 
not substitute its own judgment for that of the 
arbitrator. The court does not read Buzas to hold 
that if the parties themselves modify the License 
Agreement by their conduct, the arbitrator must 
ignore such conduct in favor of express 
contractual language. Additionally, by the 
language of Buzas it would not be irrational or 
inconsistent with the wording of the License 
Agreement for the arbitrator to conclude/interpret 
that paragraph 20.6 is capable of being modified 
by the parties themselves. The arbitrator is 
charged with interpreting the contract, and it was 
not irrational or inconsistent with the License 
Agreement as modified by the conduct of the 
parties to find that the limitation period had been 
waived by BYU and Softsolutions, 
[9] \ 34 Hence, the issue we must determine is 
whether the court's finding of waiver, in light of the 
provision requiring waivers to be in writing, is 
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irrational as a matter of law, and thus requires us to 
vacate the award because the arbitrator exceeded 
his authority. We conclude that the district court 
correctly concluded that the arbitrator acted 
rationally. Here, the arbitrator did not subtract 
from, add to, or modify the Agreement, which 
would certainly be improper. Rather, the arbitrator 
interpreted the contract as permitting the parties 
themselves to modify/waive the contractual 
limitation period, despite the express contractual 
language to the contrary. We do not find this 
interpretation of the Agreement to be irrational or 
inconsistent with the law in this state. See Provo 
City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 
(I Jtah 1979) ("It is true that parties to a written 
contract may modify, waive, or make new 
contractual terms, even if the contract itself contains 
a provision to the contrary."); see also Ted R. 
Brown & Assoes. v. Carries Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 
968 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (parties to a contract may, 
by mutual consent, modify any or all of the contract, 
even if the contract contains provision to the 
contrary). As such, the district court: did not ei i in 
refusing to vacate the award. Moreover, because 
this matter was submitted by both parties for 
decision as reflected by the Submission Agreement, 
the district court properly denied Softsolutions' 
modification request. 
*1104 E Automatic Termination of the Agreement 
[10] % 35 Fifth, Softsolutions argues that the 
district court erred in refusing to vacate or modify 
the award because the arbitrator erroneously 
awarded royalties on software sales made after the 
Agreement had automatically terminated by its own 
terms. Specifically, Softsolutions argues that the 
Agreement automatically terminated under 
paragraph 14.2D and E, on January 24, 1994, if not 
earlier, and by awarding royalties on sales after this 
date, the arbitrator blatantly exceeded his powers. 
% 36 Paragraph 14.2 provides: 
This Agreement shall be terminated automatically 
in the event of occurrence of any one of the 
fo 11 ow i ng c i reu m stan ces : 
D. in the event Softsolutions shall cease to cany 
on its business; or 
E. In the event that there is a transfer or sale of 
the Softsolutions' business purporting to transfer 
or assign this Agreement or licensed technology 
without the prior express written consent of BYU; 
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except as otherwise permitted herein. 
1) 37 The arbitrator did not explicitly address the 
automatic termination provision of 14.2 in making 
the arbitration award. However, in assessing 
whether the award should be vacated, the district 
court stated that the first prong of the Buzas test was 
met because the arbitrator was charged with 
determining the amount of royalties Soitsolutions 
owed BYU as well as determining whether the use 
of D-Search was discontinued so that royalties 
stopped accruing. In essence, the district court 
determined that an award which included royalties 
for periods before and after January 24, 1994, fit 
squarely within the Submission Agreement. We 
agree. 
[11] H 38 In addressing the second prong of Buzas, 
the district court recognized that the arbitrator did 
not give detailed reasons on this issue, but indicated 
that in arbitration law, arbitrators are not required to 
provide detailed reasons for every facet of their 
award. We agree. The court determined that the 
arbitrator did not act irrationally or inconsistently 
with paragraph 14.2D of the Agreement because the 
arbitrator could have found that the stock sale of 
STC to WordPerfect did not mean STC "ceased to 
carry on business" under 14.2D. This is a rational 
interpretation. 
[12] U 39 With respect to Softsolutions' claim that 
the arbitrator exceeded his authority by disregarding 
paragraph 14.2E, given the sale of Soitsolutions' 
business, STC, which purported to transfer or assign 
the licensed technology to WordPerfect without 
BYU's consent, the court found that the arbitrator 
did not act irrationally or inconsistently. It based 
its ruling on the following rationale: (1) The 
arbitrator could have reasonably found a violation 
of paragraph 14.5 in that STC failed to return 
D-Search after the stock sale to WordPerfect, (2) 
paragraph 14.2 (the automatic termination 
provisions) must be viewed in context with 
paragraph 14.5 (requiring the return of D-Search in 
the event of termination), (3) BYU had no notice of 
the stock sale because of the violation of paragraph 
14.5, and therefore (4) Softsolutions cannot claim 
termination under 14.2E to avoid royalty payments, 
yet exclusively possess D- Search in violation of 
paragraph 14.5 of the Agreement. We conclude 
that this analysis also meets the test of reasonabiiity 
and rationality under Buzas. As such, the district 
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court did not err in refusing to vacate the award on 
this basis. Furthermore, because the issue of 
earned royalties was submitted for decision, the 
court properly refused to modify the award. 
II. ATTORNEY FEES 
1j 40 Softsolutions appeals BYU's award of 
attorney fees. Specifically, Softsolutions contends 
that attorney fees are non-recoverable as a matter of 
law because BYU was represented by in-house 
counsel, and even if the fees are recoverable, they 
are excessive and unreasonable. As a threshold 
matter, we consider whether this issue was properly 
preserved for appeal. BYU argues that the issue of 
the recoverability of fees for an in-house attorney 
was not raised below and should be summarily 
rejected. BYU argues that Softsolutions raised 
only the issue of reasonableness and excessiveness 
of the attorney *1105 fee award in its complaint for 
declaratory judgment. However, in Softsolutions' 
objection to the form of proposed judgment, 
Softsolutions raised the issue of whether "attorney 
fees may be awarded to in- house counsel." The 
district court specifically addressed this issue,, 
concluding that 
in-house counsel is entitled to charge the same 
rates as independent outside counsel for similar 
litigation because there has been no persuasive 
evidence presented which would indicate that the 
operation of in-house counsel does not incur 
similar overhead expenses. In addition, the court 
finds no compelling reason as to why BYU 
should not be entitled to attorney's fees at a rate 
which it would have cost BYU to litigate this 
matter with comparable outside counsel had they 
had to hire such, especially when the contract, 
controlling statutes, and case law support such an 
award. 
As such, tliis issue is properly before us. 
A. In-House Counsel Fees 
[13] U • H "li i I Jtah, attorney fees are awardable 
only if authorized by statute or by contract." Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988. If a 
contract provides for attorney fees, the award "is 
allowed only in accordance with the terms of the 
contract." Id In this case, the parties' Agreement 
provided for "reasonable attorney fees." [FN3] 
Attorney fees are also authorized by the Utah 
Arbitration Act, section 78-3 la-16 of the Utah Code. 
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[FN4] 
FN3. The Agreement provided; 
Softsolutions shall also pay all reasonable 
collection costs at any time incurred by 
BYU in obtaining payment of amounts 
past due, including court costs, expenses 
associated with litigation, and reasonable 
attorneys' fees, whether or not any suit was 
commenced by BYU. 
In the event suit or an arbitration 
proceeding is commenced to construe or 
enforce any provision of this Agreement, 
the prevailing party, in addition to all other 
amounts to which such party may be 
entitled, shall be paid by the other party a 
reasonable sum for attorneys' fees and 
costs. 
(Emphasis added.) 
FN4. Section 78-3la-16 provides: 
An award which is confirmed, modified, or 
corrected by the court shall be treated and 
enforced in all respects as a judgment. 
Costs incurred incident to any motion 
authorized by this chapter, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee, unless precluded 
by the arbitration agreement, may be 
awarded by the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-16 (1996). 
lj 42 Softsolutions maintains that our decisions in 
Jones, Waldo, Hoi brook & McDonough v. Dawson, 
923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996), and Smith v. Batchelor, 
832 P.2d 467 (Utah 1992), prohibit awarding 
attorney fees to BYU because BYU was 
represented by in-house counsel. Essentially, 
Softsolutions argues that our decisions in Jones, 
Waldo and Batchelor stand for a blanket prohibition 
of attorney fee awards to pro se litigants, thus 
precluding BYU from obtaining attorney fees as a 
matter of law. 
j^ 43 In Batchelor, we held that a pro se 
attorney-litigant is not entitled to recover attorney 
fees for successful litigation. See Batchelor, 832 
P.2d at 473. Likewise in Jones, Waldo, we held 
that a pro se law firm- litigant could not recover 
attorney fees in enforcing an agreement. See 
Jones, Waldo, 923"P.2d at^  1375. \n refusing to 
award attorney fees in these cases, we focused on 
the important fact that the litigants were both in the 
business of providing legal services and thus did not 
"incur" attorney fees as a lay individual or nonlegal 
organization would. See Jones, Waldo, 923 P.2d at 
1375 (stating "[i]t is by no means self-evident that 
the time a lawyer spends on his own case represents 
fees 'incurred' "). That is, neither the law firm nor 
the attorney-litigant actually paid or became liable 
to pay consideration in exchange for legal 
representation and thus did not incur attorney fees 
in the action. It was not the fact that they were pro 
se that precluded them from recovery. Rather, it 
was the fact that they were lawyers representing 
themselves, and therefore did not incur attorney fees. 
[14] % 44 1 his case is different. BYU is 
represented in this matter without the aid of outside 
legal counsel. However, BYU is not an 
organization primarily engaged in providing legal 
services, and as such, the issue is whether a 
nonlegal organization can recover *1106 attorney 
fees when it uses the services of salaried in-house 
con n se 1. We ho Id i n th e a ffi rin at i ve. 
[15] ^ 45 Tliei e are no prior Utah cases directly 
on point. However, we are persuaded by the ample 
authority from other jurisdictions that a successful 
litigant who is not primarily engaged in providing 
legal services may recover attorney fees when 
represented by salaried in-house counsel. [FN5] 
Such an award is still limited to those occasions 
when the contract between the parties, a statute, or 
other rule of law otherwise entitles a party to 
recover attorney fees, but removes the previously 
perceived distinction between in-house and private 
counsel 
FN 5. See generally Central States, 
Southeast & Areas Pension Fund v. 
Central Cartage Co., 16 F.3d 114, 115-16 
(7th Cir. 1996) (permitting attorney fees to 
staff attorneys of nonlegal organization); 
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for 
Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272, 
278 (3d Cir. 1985)" (permitting award of 
attorney fees to nonlegal entity represented 
by in-house counsel despite case law 
holding pro se litigant ineligible for 
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attorney fees); Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. 
Selas Corp. of Am., 761 F.2d 553, 557-58 
(9th Cir. 1985) (stating attorney fees should 
be permitted to in-house counsel of 
nonlegal organization so long as counsel 
actively participated in matter); Textor v. 
Board of Regents, 711 F.2d 1387, 1396 
(7th Cir. 1983) (permitting attorney fees for 
salaried in-house counsel of universities); 
National Treasury Employees Union v. 
United States Dep't of Treasury, 656 F.2d 
848, 853 (D.C.Cir.1981) (permitting award 
of attorney fees to lay organization 
utilizing in-house counsel); National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 521 
F.2d 317 (D.C.Cir.1975) (permitting 
attorney fees award for services of 
in-house counsel of union); Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 
281 F.2d 538, 542 '(3d Cir. 1960) 
(permitting attorney fee award to glass 
company when litigation was conducted in 
part by in- house attorneys); PPG Indus., 
Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 
840 F.2d 1565, "l570 (Fed.Cir.1988) 
(permitting attorney fee award to nonlegal 
corporation when litigation conducted in 
part by in-house counsel); Goodrich v. 
Department of Navy 733 F.2d 1578, 1579 
(Fed.Cir.1984) (permitting attorney fee 
award when lawyer was employed by 
union); Holmes v. NBC/GE, V68 F.R.D. 
481, 482 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (permitting 
award of attorney fees for nonlegal entity's 
in- house counsel); Scott Paper Co. v. 
Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 604 F.Supp. 835. 
837 (D.Del. 1984) (permitting award of 
attorney fees for services by paper 
company's in-house counsel); Brisbane v. 
Port Auth., 550 F.Supp. 222 
(S.D.N.Y.1982) (permitting attorney fees 
to port authority for work by in-house 
counsel); Consumers Union of United 
States, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 410 F.Supp. 63, 65 
(D.D.C.1975) (granting attorney fees to 
non-profit consumer educational 
organization when litigation was 
conducted by in-house salaried attorneys); 
B-E-C-K Constructors, Inc. v. State, 604 
P.2d 578, 585 (Alaska 1979) (stating 
"where a party is represented by both 
Pa^e 12 
private counsel and in-house counsel who 
actively participate in the preparation of 
the case, the party may recover partial fees 
for both private and in-house counsel"): 
Trope v. Katz, 11 CaUth 274, 45 
Ca!.Rptr.2d 241, 902 P.2d 259, 271 (1995) 
(recognizing modern trend to allow 
attorney fees to litigant represented by 
in-house counsel); In re Trust Known as 
Great N. Iron Ore Properties, 31 1 N.W.2d 
488, 492-94 (Minn. 1981) (permitting 
attorney fee award to nonlegal entity for 
services of in-house counsel); Dale Elec, 
Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 205 Neb. 115, 286 
N.W.2d 437, 443 (1979) (permitting 
attorney fee award to electronics company 
using in-house counsel); Tesoro 
Petroleum Co. v. Coastal Ref. c£ Mktg., 
Inc., 754 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 
(Tex.Ct.App.1988) (concluding award of 
attorney fees for services of coastal 
refining corporation's in-house counsel was 
proper and did not violate public policy or 
code of professional responsibility); 20 
Am.Jur.2d Costs § 59 (1999) (recognizing 
attorney fee award to in- house counsel). 
But see Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 
F.2d 1480, 1499 & n. 13 (11th Cir.1983) 
(dictum implied all attorney fees clauses 
under Florida law are indemnification 
provisions and do not include payment for 
in-house counsel expenses). 
If 46 This rule is a reasonable means of 
compensating an organization for legal expenses it 
actually incurred, unlike the litigants in Jones, 
Waldo and Batchelor. That is, BYU, as a nonlegal 
entity, was required to pay consideration for the 
legal services received from its in-house counsel in 
the form of salary and other costs of employment. 
The litigants in Jones, Waldo and Batchelor did not 
actually pay or become liable to pay consideration 
in exchange for representation. We hold that BYU, 
as the successful party, was entitled to attorney fees 
for the legal services of its in-house counsel. 
B. Amount of Attorney Fee Award 
f 47 We now consider Softsolutions' argument 
that the awarded amount is unreasonable and should 
be vacated and remanded to the district court to 
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determine a reasonable fee based on the actual 
salary of counsel and direct overhead costs 
(cost-plus rate), not on prevailing market rates 
charged by outside counsel (market rates). 
*1107 U 48 In this case, the arbitrator awarded 
BYU $115,000 in attorney fees based upon a $150 
per hour market rate. The district court agreed and 
awarded BYU an additional $28,987.50 for 
post-arbitration litigation, also based upon a $150 
per hour rate. In determining a reasonable award 
of attorney fees, both the arbitrator and the district 
court considered the factors enumerated in Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990. [FN6] 
FN6. In Dixie, we stated that in 
determining a reasonable fee a district 
court should find answers to four 
questions: 
1. What legal work was actually 
performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was 
reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent 
with the rates customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require 
consideration of additional factors, 
including those listed in the Code of 
Professional Responsibility? 
764 P.2d at 990 (footnotes omitted). 
U 49 Like the district court, BYU maintains that 
most courts have endorsed an award of attorney fees 
to in-house counsel by computing the value of their 
services in the same manner as fees are computed 
for outside counsel; that is, fair market value for 
similar services from a comparably experienced 
outside lawyer. By contrast, Softsolutions argues 
that if any fees should be awarded, a cost-plus rate 
should apply. 
U 50 In Dixie, we did not draw the narrow 
distinction between a reasonable fee award based 
upon the use of in-house or outside counsel, and we 
have yet to address this issue in other cases. 
Indeed, in Dixie we held that in computing a 
reasonable attorney fee, a district court should 
consider, among other things, whether the billing 
Pase 13 
rate is consistent with the rate customarily charged 
in the locality for similar services and that it should 
consider any other circumstances which it deems 
necessary. See Dixie, 164 P.2d at 990. 
[16][17] <J 51 Courts that have considered what is 
a reasonable attorney fee award for services of 
in-house counsel have, in some cases, awarded fees 
using a cost-plus rate. [FN7] Other courts have 
employed a market-rate formula. [FN8] We are 
convinced that a cost-plus rate is the more 
reasonable measure of attorney fees to in-house 
counsel, and is consistent with the public polic> that 
the basic purpose of attorney fees is to indemnify 
the prevailing party and not to punish the losing 
party by allowing the winner a windfall profit. See 
Jones, Waldo, 923 P.2d at 1375 (indicating attorney 
fee awards are means to " 'vindicate personal 
claims' " rather than means to " 'generate fees' " 
(quoting Falcone v. Internal Revenue Serv., 714 
F.2d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 1983))). 
FN7. See, e.g., PPG, 840 F.2d at 1570; 
Goodrich, 733 F.2d at 1579; NTEU, 656 
F.2d at 853; Lacer v. Navajo County, 141 
Ariz. 392, 687 P.2d 400, ' 404 
(Ct.App.1984). 
FN8. See, e.g., Centra! States, 76 F.3d at 
115-16; Milgard, 761 F.2d at 558 
(indicating modern trend is to award 
attorney fees for in- house counsel based 
on the "market rate"); Environmental 
Defense Fund v. EPA, 672 F.2d 42. 50 
(D.C.Cir. 1982); see also Blum v. Stenson, 
465 U.S. 886, 892-96, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 
1545-47, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) 
(indicating reasonable attorney fees under 
federal statute are to be calculated 
according to prevailing market rates in 
relevant community, not according to cost 
of providing legal services, regardless of 
whether prevailing party is represented by 
private profit-making attorneys or 
nonprofit legal aid organizations). 
[18][19] 1| 52 To assist the district court on 
remand, we set forth general guidelines to be 
considered in making such an award. Fees for 
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in-house counsel are limited to consideration 
actually paid or for which the party is obligated, 
calculated using a cost-plus rate and taking into 
account (1) the proportionate share of the party's 
attorney salaries, including benefits, 'which are 
allocable to the case based upon the time expended, 
plus (2) allocated shares of the overhead expenses, 
which may include the costs of office space, support 
staff, office equipment and supplies, law library and 
continuing legal education, and similar expenses. 
See Lacer, 687 P.2d at 404. The party seeking 
recovery of fees has the burden of proving these 
amounts. 
]\ 53 Turning to the case at hand, we draw a 
distinction between the attorney fees awarded by the 
arbitrator and reviewed by the district court, and 
those fees awarded by the district court for 
post-arbitration proceedings. The scope of review 
differs. 
*1108 [20] H 54 We look first to the arbitrator's 
award of attorney fees, totaling $115,000. In Bazas 
we stated that the role of a district court and this 
court in the review of an arbitrator's factual finding 
is severely limited. See Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 948 (indicating 
trial court "does not sit to hear claims of factual or 
legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court 
does in reviewing decisions of lower courts"). 
Indeed, "whether the [district or this] court agrees 
with the arbitrator's judgment is irrelevant, as long 
as the arbitrator construed and applied the [attorney 
fees provision of the] contract in an arguably 
reasonable manner and acted within the scope of his 
authority." Inter mountain Power Agency v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co., 961 P.2d 320, 323. Because the issue 
of attorney fees was clearly submitted to the 
arbitrator, and because the arbitrator reasonably 
applied the attorney fee provisions in the 
Agreement and acted within the authority delegated 
to him by the parties, we will not disturb this 
portion of the award. 
[21][22] \ 55 Next, we turn to the district court's 
award of post- arbitration attorney fees totaling 
$29,987.50. We review the district court's award 
of attorney fees under an abuse of discretion 
standard. See Dixie, 764 P.2d at 991. Because the 
district court did not apply the rule of law relating 
to the proper measure of attorney fees recoverable 
by a nonlegal organization for the use of in-house 
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counsel, we vacate that portion of the attorney fees 
award and remand the case to the district court to 
redetermine post-arbitration attorney fees for 
in-house counsel consistent with this opinion. 
U 56 Finally, we address BYU's request for 
attorney fees on appeal. BYU has prevailed in this 
action, and therefore, we award it reasonable 
attorney fees incurred in this appeal, the amount to 
be determined by the trial court on remand, using 
the cost-plus rate. 
CONCLUSION 
U 57 In sum, we affirm the district court's denial of 
Softsolutions' motion to vacate or modify the 
arbitration award, and grant of BYU's motion to 
confirm the arbitration award. Moreover, we hold 
that attorney fees are recoverable for the services of 
in-house counsel of nonlegal entities when 
otherwise provided for by contract, statute, or other 
rule of law. The district court properly concluded 
that attorney fees were recoverable in this instance 
for the services performed by BYU's in-house 
counsel. Although the arbitrator did not calculate 
attorney fees under a cost-plus rate, given the trial 
court and this court's narrow scope of review on this 
issue, we do not disturb the arbitrator's attorney fee 
award. However, given our broader scope to 
review the trial court's post-arbitration fee award, 
we hold that the court exceeded its discretion in 
computing the attorney fee award by using a 
market-rate formula rather than a cost-plus rate. As 
such, we vacate that portion of the attorney fee 
award and remand to the district court for the 
limited purpose of calculating post-arbitration 
attorney fees, including those fees incurred on 
appeal, in accord with this opinion, 
U 58 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief 
Justice RUSSON, Justice DURHAM, and Judge 
ORME concur in Justice WILKINS' opinion. 
% 59 Having disqualified himself, Justice 
DURRANT does not participate herein; Court of 
Appeals Judge GREGORY K. ORME sat. 
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